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A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#x6X@G7X@# XX  *$HHީ'  ӧ   XX #Xj\  PHG;XP# XX  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)Ҳ#x6X@I7X@# XX  *$HHީSMALLF@6G]Small Typestyle=(F *O_F.EYZFINE_F@6G]Fine Typestyle=(F *O_F.E[\LARGEF@6G]Large Typestyle=(F *O_F.E]^2[[ZEXTRA LARGE@6G]Extra Large TypestyleF *O_F.E_`VERY LARGE@6G]Very Large TypestyleF *O_F.EabENVELOPEF @6G]Standard Business Envelope with HeaderO_F.Eecd V,  X  , 8#Xj\  PJG;XP#   I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#x6X@K7X@#    `   Style 14F @6G]Swiss 8 Pt Without MarginsF *O_F.E'e'f#Co> PLQP##)a [ PMQ)P#2"s*Style 12F@6G]Dutch Italics 11.5F *O_F.E'g'h#)^ `> XiNQ)X##)a [ POQ)P#Style 11F@6G]Initial Codes for Advanced II*O_F.Eij#)a [ PPQ)P# dn  #  [ b, oT9 !#)a [ PQQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PRQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiSQ)X#`e%(Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   #)a [ PTQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PUQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiVQ)X#Advanced Legal WordPerfect II Learning Guide   #)a [ PWQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PXQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiYQ)X#   Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`e%APage  #)a [ PZQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)a [ P[Q)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> Xi\Q)X#   Page `We%)Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 3F@6G]Dutch Roman 11.5 with Margins/Tabs*O_F.Ekl#)a [ P]Q)P# n  ## b, oT9 !Style 4F@6G]Swiss 8 Point with MarginsF *O_F.EGmn#Co> P^QP# dd  #  2U Style 1F@6G]Dutch Roman 11.5 FontF *O_F.E7op#)a [ P_Q)P# dn Style 2F@6G]Dutch Italic 11.5F *O_F.E'qr#)^ `> Xi`Q)X#Style 5F@6G]Dutch Bold 18 PointF *O_F.E's't#T~> paQTp##)a [ PbQ)P#Style 7F@6G]Swiss 11.59 =(F *O_F.E'u'v#)ao> PcQ)P##)a [ PdQ)P#2-Style 6F @6G]Dutch Roman 14 PointF *O_F.E'w'x#w [ PeQP##)a [ PfQ)P#Style 10F!@6G]Initial Codes for AdvancedF !*O_F.Eyz#)a [ PgQ)P# dn   #  [ b, oT9 !#)a [ PhQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PiQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XijQ)X#`me%)Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ PkQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PlQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XimQ)X#Advanced Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ PnQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PoQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XipQ)X#   Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`e%APage  #)a [ PqQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PrQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XisQ)X#   Page `We%)Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 8F&@6G]Initial Codes for Beginning &*O_F.E{|#)a [ PtQ)P# dn  ## b, oT9  [ #)a [ PuQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PvQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiwQ)X#`Me%)Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ PxQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PyQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XizQ)X#Beginning Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ P{Q)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ P|Q)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> Xi}Q)X#   Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`e%APage  #)a [ P~Q)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiQ)X#   Page `We%)Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 Style 9F+@6G]Initial Codes for Intermediate*O_F.E}~#)a [ PQ)P# dn  ## b, oT9 Њ [ #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiQ)X#`e%'Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiQ)X#Intermediate Legal WordPerfect Learning Guide   #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiQ)X#   Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc.`e%APage  #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9  I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 #)^ `> XiQ)X#   Page `We%)Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988 2UdpUpdateF0@6G]Initial Codes for Update Module*O_F.E#)a [ PQ)P# dn  ##  [ b, oT9 !#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiQ)X#`Ie%$Legal WordPerfect 5.0 Update Class Learning Guide   #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiQ)X#Legal WordPerfect 5.0 Update Class Learning Guide   #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a)#)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 !#)^ `> XiQ)X#   Copyright  Portola Systems, Inc. 1987, 1988`e%APage  #)a [ PQ)P# ## b, oT9 ! I. 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TimesXXj\  PG;XP%\  `$Times New RomanX2&.3|j  #Xj\  PG;XP#` `  hh#(- ` `  hh#(-pp27FCC 96278 4D& Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION D!Washington, D.C. 20554 ă In the Matter ofD*) D*) Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of theD*) Commission's Rules BroadbandD*)-pp2WT Docket No. 9659 PCS Competitive Bidding and theD*) Commercial Mobile Radio ServiceD*) Spectrum Cap` `  D*) D*) Amendment of the Commission'sD*) Cellular/PCS CrossOwnership RuleD*)-pp2GN Docket No. 90314 D*) D! REPORT AND ORDER ă  Adopted: June 21, 1996hh#(- Released: June 24, 1996 By the Commission:  TABLE OF CONTENTS Đ` `  hh#(-pp27  <xxA Paragraph I.Introduction and Executive Summary-pp27  <xxA F1 II.Rules Affecting Designated Entities-pp27  <xxA F7 A. Meeting the Adarand Standard(-pp27  <xxA7 ` ` 1. Control Group Equity Structurespp27  <xxA F19  ` ` 2. Affiliation Ruleshh#(-pp27  <xxA F28 ` `   3. Installment Payments -pp27  <xxA F37  ` ` 4. Bidding Credits hh#(-pp27  <xxA F49  ` ` 5. Information Collection(-pp27  <xxA F56 B. Definitionshh#(-pp27  <xxA F57 ` ` 1. Small Businesshh#(-pp27  <xxA F57  ` ` 2. Rural Telephone Company-pp27  <xxA F62 C. Extending Small Business Provisions to the D and E Blocks  <xxA68 FD. Adjusting Payment Provisions for 10 MHz Licenses 7  <xxA73 FE. Rules Regarding the Holding of Licenses-pp27  <xxA80 III.The Cincinnati Bell Remand(-pp27  <xxA F86 A. The Cellular/PCS Crossownership Rulepp27  <xxA F86 B. The 20 Percent Attribution Standard-pp27  <xxA108 IV.Ownership Disclosure Provisions(-pp27  <xxA F133 V.Auction Schedulehh#(-pp27  <xxA F142 VI.Other Issues hh#(-pp27  <xxA F149 A. Limit on Licenses Acquired at Auction pp27  <xxA F 149 B. Partitioning and Disaggregation -pp27  <xxA F 151  C. Bid Withdrawal hh#(-pp27  <xxA F 152 VII.Conclusion hh#(-pp27  <xxA F155 VIII.Procedural Matters and Ordering Clauses pp27  <xxA F 156 APPENDIX A: Hypothetical HerfindahlHirschman Indices APPENDIX B: Final Rules APPENDIX C: Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis APPENDIX D: List of Parties Filing Comments and Reply Comments ? D I. Introduction and Executive Summary  1. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) In this Report and Order, we modify our competitive bidding and ownership rules for the Personal Communications Services in the 2 GHz band ("broadband PCS"). Many of our rule modifications concern the treatment of designated entities, i.e., small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups and women, under our rules for the F block.jЍ The D, E, and F blocks, each consisting of 493 10 MHz BTA licenses, are among the six frequency blocks designated by the Commission for broadband licensed PCS. Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 4957, 49785082 (1994). j We also amend other broadband PCS rules in order to encourage sincere bidding, streamline the auction process, and lessen administrative burdens. In addition, in response to the remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC,HЍ 69 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 1995).H we modify our rules governing cellular licensees' ownership of broadband PCS licenses in all frequency blocks.  As we explained in the Notice of Proposed Rule Making,^Ѝ Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, WT Docket 9659, FCC 96119, 61 Fed. Reg. 13133 (March 26, 1996) ("Notice"). In response to this Notice, 63 comments and 22 reply comments were filed. A list of commenters is attached as Appendix D.^ we were prompted by the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe9aCЍ 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).C to reexamine our race and genderbased F block rules. We adopted these rules in the Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order in order to fulfill our mandate under Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended ("Communications Act"), to provide opportunities for businesses owned by members of minority groups and women to participate in the provision of spectrumbased services.*Ѝ Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding, Fifth Report and Order, PP Docket 93253, 9 FCC Rcd 5532 (1994) ("Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order"), recon. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, PP Docket 93253, 10 FCC Rcd 403 (1994) ("Competitive Bidding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order"), erratum, 60 Fed. Reg. 5333 (Jan. 27, 1995).* After we adopted these rules, however, the Supreme Court held in Adarand that any federal program that makes distinctions on the basis of race must satisfy the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.NЍ Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.N  Having examined the comments submitted in response to the Notice, we conclude that the present record is insufficient to support our racebased F block rules under the strict scrutiny standard, or to support our genderbased rules under the intermediate scrutiny standard that currently applies to those rules. We have considered the need to award the remaining broadband PCS licenses expeditiously and to promote the rapid deployment of new services to the public without judicial delays, as well as the statutory objective of disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including designated entities.TЍ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3)(A) and (B).T Bearing these factors in mind, we conclude that, to avoid uncertainty and the delay that would likely result from legal challenges to the special provisions for minority and womenowned businesses in our broadband PCS rules, it is appropriate to make our F block rules race and genderneutral.0Ѝ See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act Competitive Bidding, Sixth Report and Order, PP Docket 93253, 11 FCC Rcd 136 (1995) ("Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order"), which modified the designated entity provisions of the C block rules to make them race and genderneutral. The Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order was affirmed recently by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996).0 We believe that our action here is consistent with our obligations under Section 309(j). Ѝ We also have initiated a comprehensive rule making proceeding to explore market barriers to women and minorityowned businesses as well as small businesses pursuant to Section 257 of the Communications Act. See Section 257 Proceeding to Identify and Eliminate Market Entry Barriers for Small Businesses, Notice of Inquiry, GN Docket No. 96113, FCC 96216 (rel. May 21, 1996) ("Market Entry Notice of Inquiry").  As we explained in the Notice, our experience conducting the A, B, and C block broadband PCS auctions also led us to examine other aspects of our rules, and we have determined that we should take certain steps to streamline our procedures and minimize the possibility of insincere bidding and bidder default. To achieve these goals, to make our F block rules race and genderneutral, and in response to the Cincinnati Bell decision, we make the following changes: We amend Section 24.709 and eliminate Section 24.715 of the Commission's Rules to make the 50.1 percent "control group" equity structure, which previously was available only to women and minorityowned businesses for purposes of F block eligibility, available to all small businesses and entrepreneurs.O Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.709 & 24.715.O We amend Section 24.720 of the Commission's Rules to eliminate the exception to our F block affiliation rules that excludes the gross revenues and assets of certain affiliates controlled by investors who are members of the applicants control group.B Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.720.B We amend Section 24.716 of the Commission's Rules to eliminate two of the installment payment plans available to F block applicants and extend the most favorable plan to all small businesses.B Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.716.B We also shorten the interestonly payment period of this plan from six to two years. We amend Section 24.717 of the Commission's Rules to eliminate bidding credits based on minority and womenowned status. Instead, we provide for a twotiered small business bidding credit.B Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.717.B We amend our definition of "rural telephone company" in Section 24.720 of the Commission's Rules to make it conform to the definition in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act").BЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.720.B We amend Sections 24.706 and 24.716 of the Commission's Rules to raise upfront payments for the D, E, and F blocks to $0.06 per MHzpop and the down payment for the F block to 20 percent.OЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.706 & 24.716.O We amend Section 24.839(d) of the Commission's Rules to relax the restriction on designated entities' ability to transfer broadband PCS licenses.EЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.839(d).E We eliminate Section 24.204 and amend Section 24.229 of the Commission's Rules to abolish our cellular/PCS crossownership rule and our PCS spectrum cap and rely on the 45 MHz cap on Commercial Mobile Radio Services ("CMRS") spectrum in Section 20.6.VЍ 47 C.F.R.  20.6, 24.204, & 24.229.V We amend Section 20.6 of the Commission's Rules to eliminate the 40 percent attribution threshold's application to ownership interests held by minority and womenowned companies for purposes of the CMRS spectrum cap; expand the postauction divestiture provisions to come into conformity with those previously applied in our cellular/PCS crossownership rule; and allow an affirmative showing that an otherwise attributable ownership interest should not be attributed to its holder.@Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  20.6.@ We amend Section 24.813 of the Commission's Rules to reduce ownership information disclosure requirements.BЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.813.B  To expedite the delivery of broadband PCS services to the public, we plan to offer the D, E, and F block licenses together in one simultaneous multiple round auction. Recognizing that there are operational concerns with auctioning all 1,479 licenses in the same auction, however, we also delegate authority to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to conduct two concurrent auctions if circumstances warrant. In general, we favor a single auction because of the efficiency it will provide to bidders and the Commission and the speed with which it will deliver the 10 MHz broadband PCS licenses into the hands of parties that can begin providing service to the public.  Finally, we address a number of other issues that were raised by commenters. We decline to modify our limitation on the total number of licenses that may be won by bidders in the C and F block auctions. In response to concerns about the impact of our rules regarding bids that are made erroneously, we amend Section 24.704 of our rules to modify our bid withdrawal payment requirements.  II. Rules Affecting Designated Entities Đ ÌA. Meeting the Adarand Standard  Background. In the Notice, we explained the history of our race and genderbased F block rules, the statutory objectives they were designed to promote, and the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand v. Pe9a. As we discussed, an intermediate scrutiny standard of review was applied to federal race and genderbased programs at the time our F block rules were adopted. In Adarand, however, the Supreme Court held that all racial classifications, whether imposed at the federal, state or local government level, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny, which requires such classifications to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest.NЍ Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.N An intermediate scrutiny standard of review (under which a provision is constitutional if it serves an important governmental objective and is substantially related to achievement of that objective) continues to apply to genderbased measures.Ѝ See, e.g., Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 157980 (11th Cir. 1994); Contractors Association v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 100910 (3d Cir. 1993); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 93031 (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992). We note, however, that the Supreme Court has not addressed constitutional challenges to federal genderbased programs since Adarand.Ѝ But see United States v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995) (constitutional challenge to state genderbased program currently pending before the Court).   In the Notice, we observed that judicial precedent indicates that only a record of discrimination against a particular racial group would support remedial measures designed to benefit that group and that generalized assertions of discrimination are inadequate. We explained that, although we have some general evidence of discrimination against certain racial groups, none of the evidence we have appears adequate to satisfy strict scrutiny. We requested comment on a number of questions related to this analysis, including whether compensating for discrimination in lending practices and in practices in the communications industry constitutes a compelling governmental interest. We also asked interested parties to comment on non-remedial objectives that might be considered compelling governmental interests, such as increased diversity in ownership and employment in the communications industry or increased industry competition. We asked parties to submit statistical data, personal accounts, studies, or any other data relevant to the entry of specific racial groups into the field of telecommunications, and we asked whether our racebased provisions are narrowly tailored to serve the interests that commenters assert to be compelling governmental interests.KЍ Notice at  2022.K We also tentatively concluded that the present record in support of our genderbased F block rules may be insufficient to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, and we asked commenters to submit evidence relevant to the entry of women into the field of telecommunications.AЍ Id. at  23.A  In the Notice, we also tentatively concluded that we should not delay the F block auction for the amount of time it would take to adduce sufficient evidence to support our race and genderbased F block provisions, and that proceeding with the F block auction with these rules intact would not serve the public interest because it might result in litigation that ultimately would delay the auction of additional broadband PCS licenses and, thus, postpone the introduction of new competition to the marketplace. We tentatively concluded that, if we were unable to gather sufficient evidence to support our race and genderbased provisions in this proceeding, we should eliminate these provisions from our rules and proceed as expeditiously as possible to auction the remaining broadband PCS licenses.AЍ Id. at  26.A  Comments. The majority of commenters addressing our present record in support of racebased F block provisions believe that this record is insufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.Ѝ See Sprint Corp. Comments at 2 ("Sprint"); Virginia PCS Alliance, L.C. Comments at 2 ("The Alliance"); US West, Inc. Comments at 1, n.1 ("US West"); Auction Strategy Comments at 1; Vanguard Cellular Systems, Inc. Comments at 2 ("Vanguard"); Advanced Telecommunications Technology, Inc. Comments at 2 ("Advanced"); Columbia Cellular, Inc. Comments at 1 ("Columbia"). Moreover, no parties offered specific anecdotal or statistical evidence to support our racebased F block rules. CIRI, however, states that Congress and the Commission have been presented with substantial evidence of the need to promote economic opportunity for minorities, particularly in the communications industry._Ѝ Cook Inlet Region, Inc. Comments at 2122 ("CIRI")._ Encouraging the Commission to review this evidence, CIRI contends that the Commission should retain its minority preference provisions and can justify these provisions under the strict scrutiny standard mandated by Adarand.?Ѝ Id. at 1719.? According to Ondas, the lack of Latinoowned C block license winners serves as statistical and anecdotal evidence to support the F block racedbased rules.hЍ Ondas Communications Services, Inc. Comments at 1 ("Ondas").h  With respect to our genderbased F block provisions, the majority of commenters addressing our present record agree with our tentative conclusion that this record may be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.Ѝ See Sprint Comments at 2; The Alliance Comments at 2; US West Comments at 1, n.1; Auction Strategy Comments at 1; Columbia Comments at 1. No commenters offered data to supplement our record supporting genderbased provisions. AWRT and Antigone, however, contend that the record in support of our genderbased provisions will withstand intermediate scrutiny, and they ask the Commission to retain genderbased preferences for the F block auction.Ѝ American Women in Radio and Television Comments at 58 ("AWRT"); Antigone Communications L.P. Comments at 26 ("Antigone"). These commenters argue that the genderbased provisions are substantially related to the achievement of a goal mandated by Congress and that there are no more narrowly tailored alternatives available, nor any that put less of a burden upon men and maleowned entities.W Ѝ AWRT Comments at 9; Antigone Comments at 4.W   Most commenters support making the F block auction rules race and genderneutral.Q!Ѝ See Sprint Comments at 2; Auction Strategy Comments at 1; The Alliance Comments at 3; Phoenix L.L.C. Comments at 23 ("Phoenix"); Conestoga Wireless Company Comments at 3 ("Conestoga"); Iowa L.P. 136 Comments at 45 ("Iowa"); National Telecom PCS, Inc. Comments at 23 ("NatTel"); North Coast Mobile Communications, Inc. Comments at 35 ("NCMC"); PCS Development Corporation Comments at 24 ("PCSD"); Harvey Leong Comments at 2 ("Leong"). See also Coalition of New York Rural Telephone Companies Comments at 23 ("NY Coalition"); U.S. Intelco Wireless Communications, Inc. Comments at 45 ("USIW"); National Telephone Cooperative Association Comments at 2 ("NTCA"); Telephone Electronics Corp. Comments at 12 ("TEC"); Personal Communications Industry Association Comments at 67 and Reply Comments at 23 ("PCIA"); Columbia Comments at 1 (offering alternatives to our proposal to proceed with the F block in generally the same way we proceeded with the C block but nonetheless supporting our conclusion to make our rules race and genderneutral).Q AirLink and Auction Strategy, for example, recommend that, as in the C block auction, the Commission extend to all small businesses the same special provisions originally provided to small minority and womenowned companies.v"Ѝ AirLink L.L.C. Comments at 13 ("AirLink"); Auction Strategy Comments at 1.v DCR, a minority and womenowned business, believes that the Commission should forego the use of race and genderbased special provisions in the F block to ensure that small businesses have a prompt and meaningful opportunity to compete for 10 MHz licenses.]#Ѝ DCR Communications, Inc. Comments at 24 ("DCR").] In this connection, DCR notes that providing incentives to all small businesses will encourage the participation of minority and womenowned businesses.;$Ѝ Id. at 4.; Similarly, PCIA and Gulfstream believe that the Commission can best serve its statutory duties to assist minority and womenowned businesses by adopting generous rules for small businesses.%Ѝ PCIA Comments at 7; Gulfstream Communications, Inc. Comments at 56 ("Gulfstream"). Devon, a womencontrolled company, also agrees with the proposal to eliminate race and genderbased provisions, stating that it is critical to avoid delays in licensing.h&Ѝ Devon Mobile Communications, L.P. Comments at 23 ("Devon").h AT&T argues that we should not repeat the use of special provisions for small businesses in the F block in light of the "undesirable results" of the C block auction./'Ѝ AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. Comments at 46 ("AT&T"); see also TEC Comments at 2 (noting that TEC would not object to race and genderbased preferences if such preferences were justified by a record sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements). / Allied opposes proceeding to auction with race and genderneutral rules without first conducting a "Croson study."(Ѝ Allied Communications Group, Inc. Comments at 4 ("Allied").  The Supreme Court said in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. that significant statistical disparities between the level of minority participation in a particular field and the percentage of qualified minorities in the applicable pool could permit an inference of discrimination that would support the use of racial classifications intended to correct those disparities. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989). Croson studies have been undertaken in the past to determine whether such disparities exist at the state or local level.  Decision. Having evaluated the record before us, we revise our F block rules to make them race and genderneutral. Overall, the commenters agree that this approach will best serve our goal of rapidly conducting the F block auction with the least risk of judicial delay. Moreover, the arguments presented against it were, for the most part, already considered in the Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, in which we concluded that the C block auction rules should be race and genderneutral. Significantly, this conclusion was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which held in Omnipoint v. FCC that we acted reasonably in concluding that, in light of the additional time it would take to develop a record to support the race and genderbased provisions for the C block, we should revise these rules by providing the most favorable terms to all small businesses, i.e., "leveling benefits upward."U)Ѝ Omnipoint v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 633.U In light of the comments and the Omnipoint decision, and because we do not have sufficient evidence to support our F block race and genderbased provisions in this proceeding, we conclude that making our F block rules race and genderneutral will serve the public interest by enabling us to auction the remaining broadband PCS licenses as expeditiously as possible.  We recognize, as CIRI points out, that we have been presented with important evidence of the need to promote economic opportunity for minorities. Thus, in the Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, when we adopted the racebased provisions for the entrepreneurs' blocks assuming an intermediate level of scrutiny, we cited studies and other evidence to support the existence of widespread discrimination against minorities in lending practices.s*Ѝ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 557374.s The evidence that we cited showed the difficulty African and HispanicAmericans have in obtaining mortgage loans;?+Ѝ Id. at 5573. ? the difficulty AfricanAmerican business borrowers face in raising capital;A,Ѝ Id. at 557374.A and the shortage of capital as the principal problem faced by minorities seeking ownership opportunities in the broadcast industry.A-Ѝ Id. at 557678.A We believe such data are important. However, CIRI has not demonstrated that this information will be sufficient to provide a basis for measures benefitting specific racial groups seeking to participate in broadband PCS.  We also believe that at this time we cannot agree with AWRT and Antigone's proposal that we retain the genderbased F block provisions. As noted above, the Supreme Court has not addressed the level of scrutiny courts must apply to genderbased programs since Adarand. This issue is the subject of a case currently pending before the Court.J.Ѝ See supra note 22.J Additionally we observe that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the C block auction under an intermediate scrutiny standard on the basis of race and genderbased provisions identical to those adopted for the F block.F/Ѝ Telephone Electronics Corp. v. FCC, No. 951015 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (order granting stay). Under Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the governing case law at the time, intermediate scrutiny was applied to both race and genderbased provisions.F Thus, we believe that retaining the genderbased provisions would create a substantial risk of delaying the F block auction due to litigation and could result in future legal challenges in the course of licensing F block winners.e0Ѝ For similar reasons, we will not adopt Antigone's proposal that we exempt womenowned applicants from the 25 percent foreign ownership threshold adopted in Market Entry and Regulation of ForeignAffiliated Entities, Report and Order, IB Docket No. 9522, FCC 95475 (Nov. 30, 1995). Antigone Comments at 6.e  In deciding to make our F block rules race and genderneutral, we are balancing competing objectives under Section 309(j), including mandates to provide opportunities for women and minorities while at the same time to promote competition and the rapid delivery of services to the public.E1Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3).E On balance, we conclude that making our rules race and genderneutral is the best approach at this time, and the record reveals that many small businesses and women or minorityowned entities agree with this assessment.|2Ѝ See, e.g., DCR Comments at 24; Devon Comments at 2; PCSD Comments at 45.| Also, we believe the impact of this change in our rules may not be significant, because many minority and womenowned entities are small businesses and will therefore qualify for the same special provisions that would have applied to them under our previous rules.3Ѝ See generally 1992 Survey of MinorityOwned Business Enterprises, December 11, 1995, Agriculture and Financial Statistics Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce; 1992 Survey of WomenOwned Businesses, January 29, 1996, Agriculture and Financial Statistics Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. Thus, we believe that our amended rules will continue to fulfill our mandate under Section 309(j) to provide opportunities for minority and womenowned businesses to become providers of spectrumbased services.  Moreover, as noted above, we have initiated a separate inquiry to gather evidence regarding barriers to entry faced by minority and womenowned firms as well as small businesses.C4Ѝ See supra note 9.C If a sufficient record can be adduced, we will consider race and genderbased provisions for future auctions. Toward this end, we have already gathered some information from recent auctions, including data on women and minorityowned business participation. Minority and womenowned firms participated in the C block auction in the absence of race and genderbased rules, for example, and 36 percent of the winning bidders were women and minorityowned firms.5Ѝ Thirtytwo of the 89 winning bidders claimed women and/or minorityowned status. C Block Auction Closing Press Conference, Press Package (May 6, 1996). On the other hand, we note that in other auctions where no race or genderbased preferences were available, minority and womenowned firm participation has not been as substantial. We will continue to track such information and evaluate it with other data gathered with the goal of developing a record to support race and genderbased provisions that will satisfy judicial scrutiny. We note that by September 1997 we are required to submit a report to Congress on this issue.I6Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(12)(D).I Finally, we are looking for other ways to reduce barriers to entry for women and minorityowned businesses, such as allowing partitioning and disaggregation of broadband PCS licenses, an adjustment to our rules that may be helpful to small businesses generally.7Ѝ The Commission plans to issue a notice of proposed rule making seeking comment on whether our partitioning and disaggregation rules for broadband PCS should be changed.  Our decision to make the F block auction rules race and genderneutral leads us to modify specific F block provisions. As explained below, these provisions include the control group equity structures, the affiliation rules, installment payment plans, and bidding credits.  1. Control Group Equity Structures  Background. The F block auction is limited to applicants that, together with their affiliates and persons or entities that hold interests in them, have gross revenues of less than $125 million in each of the last two years and total assets of less than $500 million. In the Notice, we described the control group equity structures that applicants may use to establish eligibility to participate in the F block auction. Under the first equity structure option, the control group must hold at least 25 percent of the applicant's total equity.H8Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.715(b)(5).H Of that 25 percent, at least 15 percent must be held by "qualifying investors."9Ѝ Id. Under our rules, "qualifying investors" are defined as members of or holders of an interest in members of the applicant's or licensee's control group whose gross revenues and total assets, when aggregated with those of all other attributable investors and affiliates, do not exceed the gross revenues and total assets restrictions specified in our rules with regard to eligibility for entrepreneurs' block licenses. 47 C.F.R.  24.720(n)(1). If these and certain other requirements are met, the remaining 75 percent of the applicant's equity may be held by other non-controlling investors, and the gross revenues and total assets of any such investor will not be attributed to the applicant provided that the investor holds no more than 25 percent of the total equity of the applicant.H:Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.715(b)(3).H Under the second equity structure option, available to minority and womenowned applicants only,H;Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.715(b)(6).H the control group must own at least 50.1 percent of the applicant's total equity. Of that 50.1 percent equity, at least 30 percent must be held by qualifying investors who are members of minority groups or women.N<Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.715(b)(6)(i)(A).N If these and certain other requirements are met, the remaining 49.9 percent of the applicant's equity may be held by non-controlling investors, and the gross revenues and total assets of any such investor will not be attributed.H=Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.715(b)(4).H  In the Notice, we tentatively concluded that, in the absence of a sufficient record to support offering the 50.1/49.9 percent equity structure only to women and minorityowned businesses, we should make it available to small businesses and entrepreneurs as we did in our C block competitive bidding rules.d>Ѝ A "small business" is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and persons or entities that hold interest in such entity and their affiliates, has average gross revenues that are not more than $40 million for the preceding three years. 47 C.F.R.  24.720(b)(1). An "entrepreneur" is an entity that, together with its affiliates and persons holding interests in the entity and their affiliates, has gross revenues of less than $125 million in each of the last two calendar years and total assets of less than $500 million. 47 C.F.R.  24.709(a).d Alternatively, we stated that we could simplify or abandon both control group equity structure options for F block applicants. Finally, we asked commenters to discuss whether there was any need to make adjustments to the financial eligibility threshold for the F block auction and whether there was a concern that C block winners might be disqualified from acquiring F block licenses by virtue of the valuation of their C block licenses.  Comments. Most commenters support extending the 50.1/49.9 equity option to all entrepreneurs and small businesses either expressly or by simply stating that the F block rules should mirror the C block rules.?Ѝ See Ad Hoc Rural PCS Coalition Comments at 18 ("PCS Coalition") ; Sprint Comments at 23; PCSD Comments at 45; Vanguard Comments at 23; CIRI Comments at 3; DCR Comments at 45; Devon Comments at 6; Iowa Comments at 45; NCMC Comments at 56; MidPlains Telephone, Inc. Comments at 12 ("MidPlains"); Leong Comments at 4; WPCS, Inc. Comments at 1 ("WPCS"); PCIA Comments at 9 and Reply Comments at 3. Vanguard and NCMC, for example, advocate this approach because it has already passed judicial review.Y@Ѝ Vanguard Comments at 23; NCMC Comments at 6.Y Many commenters cited interference with preexisting ownership and investment relationships as their reason for opposing any other change to the control group structures.AЍ See, e.g., PCS Coalition at 18; DCR Comments at 4; Devon Comments at 6; NCMC Comments at 6. AirLink, for example, states that the control group rules are now familiar to the investment community and industry and that their certainty and specificity provide a road map for investors and entrepreneurs.CBЍ AirLink Comments at 14.C  Other commenters oppose extending the 50.1/49.9 percent equity structure option to all small businesses and entrepreneurs because they claim that it has become a vehicle for subsidizing large companiesCЍ Point Enterprises, Inc. Comments at 2 ("Point"); see also NTCA Comments at 4. and that it has resulted in convoluted applicant ownership structures for designated entities.MDЍ NY Coalition Comments at 3.M Radiofone argues that our extension of the 50.1/49.9 percent equity option to all small businesses in the C block was based on the fact that many minority and womenowned businesses had already established equity structures based on this provision, a justification that does not apply to the F block. Radiofone also asserts that because no 10 MHz licenses have been issued and large businesses will not have a "headstart" over entrepreneurs, time considerations do not compel an extension of the 50.1/49.9 percent equity structure option as they did for the C block.XEЍ Radiofone, Inc. Comments at 9 ("Radiofone").X Radiofone further argues that removing this exception completely from the F block rules should not prejudice minority or womenowned businesses, which will have time to utilize other financing options.KFЍ Radiofone Reply Comments at 19.K  Conestoga, addressing directly the issue of whether we should change the financial eligibility threshold for the F block, contends that we should employ our previously established thresholds.DGЍ Conestoga Comments at 3.D Conestoga also asserts that C block winners should be allowed to participate in the F block auction so long as the value of their C block license does not change their financial status.5HЍ Id.5 Similarly, AirLink and other commenters argue that C block licenses should be counted as assets by C block auction winners in determining whether they are eligible for the F block auction.IЍ AirLink Comments at 10. See also CIRI Comments at 1011; NatTel Comments at 4; NCMC Comments at 8; NCMC Reply Comments at 6. On the other hand, some commenters, such as Sprint, DCR, the Alliance, Western Wireless, NextWave, and Devon, advocate excluding C block licenses from F block applicants' assets.JЍ Sprint Comments at 7; DCR Comments at 67; Alliance Comments at 4; Western Wireless Corp. Comments at 28 ("Western"); NextWave Telecom, Inc. Reply Comments at 5 ("NextWave"); Devon Comments at 11. Other commenters suggest ways of conducting the F block auction that would amount to a change in the financial eligibility threshold. For example, the PCS Coalition, the NY Coalition, USIW, Liberty, and the NTCA advocate a 10 MHz spectrum block setaside for small businesses and rural telephone companies.)KЍ PCS Coalition Comments at 4; NY Coalition Comments at 45; USIW Comments at 4; Liberty Cellular, Inc. Comments at 67 ("Liberty"); NTCA Comments at 4. See also Leong Comments at 4 (F block should be set aside for small and very small businesses).) TEC and Mountain Solutions propose setting aside all three 10 MHz blocks as small business blocks, as the only approach that will allow small businesses to aggregate 30 MHz of PCS spectrum.LЍ TEC Comments at 45; Mountain Solutions Comments at 4; see also Ken W. Bray Comments at 2 ("Bray"); but see BellSouth Reply Comments at 5. Conversely, AT&T argues that all three 10 MHz blocks should be open to all competitors.EMЍ AT&T Reply Comments at 3.E Finally, Gulfstream proposes that all CMRS licensees be precluded from bidding on the F block to prevent spectrum warehousing and promote competition.INЍ Gulfstream Comments at 1213.I  Decision. As part of our decision to make the F block rules race and genderneutral, we conclude that the 50.1/49.9 percent equity option should be available to all small businesses and entrepreneurs. As we stated in the Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order (where we made this same modification to the C block rules), we believe that applicants and the public interest will be better served if we proceed in a manner that both reduces the likelihood of legal challenges and enhances the opportunities for a wide variety of applicants, including designated entities, to obtain licenses and rapidly deploy broadband PCS.pOЍ Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 146.p The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this approach when it upheld our decision to level benefits upward for C block applicants.RPЍ See Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 633. R We also adopt this rule modification because we believe that making the same equity structures available to both C and F block applicants is necessary so that C block participants will not be required to structure themselves differently in order to participate in the F block auction. When we extended the 50.1/49.9 percent equity option to all small business applicants in the C block, we did so in part because minority and womenowned applicants had already structured themselves under this rule, and we determined that retaining it would help to preserve existing business relationships formed upon such reliance. Providing for the same control group structures for the F block will benefit C block participants that also wish to apply for the F block. Moreover, it will benefit other entities that did not participate in the C block auction because it continues equity structures that are familiar to the industry and the financial community.HQЍ We note that in the Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, we clarified the definition of "qualifying investor" in Section 24.720(n) of the Commission's Rules for purposed of our control group rules. Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 149150.H   We decline to make adjustments to the financial eligibility thresholds in our F block rules, which were previously justified in the Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order as promoting diversity of licensees without excluding firms that are likely to have the financial ability to provide sustained competition.pRЍ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5586.p We believe that retaining the same thresholds as those used for the C block will allow for participation by entities which used our C block rules as guidelines for determining their structure in preparation for the F block auction. Moreover, these thresholds were used by C block bidders, many of whom will be interested in participating in the F block auction. We decline to further restrict participation in the F block (or any of the other 10 MHz blocks) to small businesses and rural telephone companies. We believe that setting aside the F block for both entrepreneurs and small businesses will be sufficient to achieve our objectives of providing opportunities for small businesses to obtain 10 MHz licenses and ensuring broad dissemination of 10 MHz licenses.  In addition, we decline to treat C block licenses as assets that could potentially preclude C block winners from F block eligibility, as some commenters advocate. We believe it would be unfair to disqualify C block winners on the basis of their success in acquiring capital to participate in that auction, primarily because we have indicated previously that the C and F blocks are linked. Specifically, we have stated that the C and F blocks occupy contiguous spectrum that offers the opportunity for entrepreneurs to efficiently aggregate spectrum.ASЍ Id. at 558788.A Also, when we imposed a limitation on the total number of licenses that may be awarded to a single entity in the entrepreneurs' blocks, we provided that "no single entity may win more than 10 percent of the licenses available in the entrepreneurs' blocks, or 98 licenses. These licenses may all be in frequency block C or all in frequency block F, or in some combination of the two blocks.">TЍ Id. at 5606.> We believe that treating C block winners' licenses as an asset for purposes of eligibility for the F block auction could frustrate business plans and auction strategies made in reliance on our previous statements.\UЍ See, e.g., NextWave Reply Comments at 56.\ We note also that it is uncertain whether the C block licenses will be issued before the F block auction begins.  For the reasons stated above, we will not consider C block licenses as assets for purposes of F block eligibility, but we do believe that other types of licenses should be considered as assets. Applicants should be aware that other licenses (such as Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR"), narrowband PCS, broadband PCS A and B blocks, and cellular) should be included in their total asset calculations for the F block. 2. Affiliation Rules  Background. In the Notice, we discussed the exceptions to our affiliation rules applicable to the F block. These rules identify all individuals and entities whose gross revenues and assets must be aggregated with those of the applicant to determine whether the applicant exceeds the financial caps for the entrepreneurs blocks or for small business size status. There are two exceptions to these rules. Under the first exception, Indian tribes and Alaska Regional or Village Corporations organized pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.  1601 et seq., are not considered affiliates of an applicant owned and controlled by such tribes and corporations.LVЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.720(l)(11)(i). This exception, however, provides for a rebuttable presumption that revenues derived from gaming pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act will be included in the applicant's eligibility determination. See 25 U.S.C.  2701 et seq.L Under the second exception, the gross revenues and assets of affiliates controlled by minority investors who are members of the applicants control group are not attributed to the applicant.>WЍ We note that this exception for F block applicants, which was originally codified as a rule applying to both the C block and the F block at 47 C.F.R.  24.720(l)(11)(ii), was inadvertently eliminated from our rules when we modified it for purposes of the C block auction.>  In the Notice, we requested comment on whether, if we determined that the record was insufficient to support an exception to our affiliation rules based on race, we should amend our affiliation rule for the F block to eliminate the exception pertaining to minority investors, or whether we should modify the exception as we did for the C block. This modified rule, 47 C.F.R.  24.720(l)(11)(ii), allows all small business applicants to exclude any affiliates who would otherwise qualify as entrepreneurs by having gross revenues of less than $125 million and total assets of less than $500 million and whose total assets and gross revenues, when considered on a cumulative basis and aggregated with each other, do not exceed these amounts. This rule was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.LXЍ Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 631.L  We did not propose to eliminate the affiliation exception for Indian tribes and Alaska Regional or Village Corporations. We tentatively concluded that the "Indian Commerce Clause" of the United States Constitution provides an independent basis for this exception that is not implicated by the holding in Adarand.YЍ Notice at  39. See also Order on Reconsideration, 9 FCC Rcd 4493 (1994); Competitive Bidding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 427.  Comments. Point urges us not to adopt the modified minority investors exception that we adopted for the C block, stating that this exception merely gave opportunities to large companies.BZЍ Point Comments at 23.B Similarly, DCR asserts that the exception is inconsistent with the goals of special provisions for small businesses because it permits control group members to be affiliated with large businesses, raising questions of control.@[Ѝ DCR Comments at 56.@ DCR contends that while C block licensees that relied on the exception should not be excluded from the F block, the exception should not be extended to new applicants.>\Ѝ DCR Comments at 6.>  Sprint, on the other hand, asserts that all small business applicants should be allowed to exclude from attribution the assets of affiliates that would themselves qualify as entrepreneurs.A]Ѝ Sprint Comments at 3.A PCSD, Vanguard, NatTel, Conestoga, NCMC, RTC, PCIA, and WPCS also support adoption of the same change that we made for the C block.*^Ѝ PCSD Comments at 56; Vanguard Comments at 3; NatTel Comments at 3; Conestoga Comments at 3; NCMC Comments at 9; Roseville Telephone Company Comments at 45 ("RTC"); PCIA Comments at 10; WPCS Comments at 4. See also Radiofone Reply Comments at 22.* Antigone asserts that the Commission should extend the C block affiliation rules to the D, E, and F blocks and that it should limit its inquiry with respect to entities not under common control to whether together they own cognizable interests in CMRS.C_Ѝ Antigone Comments at 7.C According to TEC, the FCC should not allow any investment in bidders by individuals or entities that do not individually and in the aggregate qualify as small businesses.A`Ѝ TEC Comments at 810.A  CIRI and WPCS support our tentative conclusion that the "Indian Commerce Clause" of the United States Constitution provides an independent basis for the affiliation exception for Indian tribes and Alaska Regional or Village Corporations that is not affected by the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand.TaЍ CIRI Comments at 12; WPCS Comments at 2.T PCIA also supports retention of this exception.@bЍ PCIA Comments at 10.@  Decision. We will eliminate the exception to our affiliation rules pertaining to minority investors for purposes of the F block auction. We believe that to retain this exception in its present state poses legal risks that, as discussed above, could delay the award of F block licenses. Furthermore, we decline to adopt the modification that we utilized for the C block, which enabled small business applicants to be affiliated with larger entrepreneursize entities without jeopardizing their eligibility.  We adopted the modified exception for the C block in order to allow small businesses to pool their resources in a capital intensive service.ycЍ Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15455.y We stated that we believed that these firms face barriers to raising capital not faced by larger firms and that small businesses experienced in managing smaller businesses should not be penalized because they own or are otherwise affiliated with other businesses whose assets and revenues must be considered on a cumulative basis and aggregated for purposes of qualifying for the C block.5dЍ Id.5 We observe also that the rule modification for the C block was adopted at a time when a number of minorityowned applicants had relied on the rule and had structured their business arrangements accordingly.?eЍ See Id.? The D.C. Circuit found our modification of this rule to accommodate these applicants to be appropriate under the circumstances.LfЍ Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 631.L Commenters, however, have criticized this exception as contrary to our purpose of offering opportunities to small businesses because it opened the door to somewhat larger entities being able to participate as small businesses in the C block auction.  Upon further consideration, we are not convinced that the C block exception is needed under current circumstances, and we acknowledge the argument that the exception may qualify too many larger entities as small businesses. We believe the smaller 10 MHz F block licenses, in particular, will be attractive to smaller entities. In that regard, we believe that declining to adopt the C block exception for the F block advances opportunities for smaller firms that may be well suited to compete for 10 MHz broadband PCS licenses. As discussed below, we will offer "tiered" bidding credits to benefit varying sizes of small businesses planning to participate in the F block auction. For applicants that participated in the C block auction and relied on our affiliation exceptions in structuring themselves, we will consider requests to waive our rules to allow them to be eligible to participate in the F block auction. Finally, we will retain the exception to our affiliation rules for Indian tribes and Alaska Regional or Village Corporations.  3. Installment Payments  Background. Our existing F block rules provide for five different installment payment plans.BgЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716.B The first plan, available to entities with gross revenues in excess of $75 million, allows them to pay interest based on the tenyear U.S. Treasury rate plus 3.5 percent, with payment of principal and interest amortized over the term of the license.HhЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(b)(1).H The second plan, available to entities with gross revenues between $40 and $75 million, provides for interestonly payments for one year, with the principal and interest equal to the tenyear U.S. Treasury rate plus 2.5 percent amortized over the remaining nine years of the license term.HiЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(b)(2).H The third plan, available only to entities that qualify as a small business or consortium of small businesses, provides for the payment of interest at the tenyear U.S. Treasury rate plus 2.5 percent, but allows eligible entities to make interestonly payments for two years, with principal and interest amortized over the remaining eight years of the license term.IjЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(b)(3). I The fourth plan, available only to businesses owned by members of minority groups or women, provides for interestonly payments for three years and payments of principal and interest over the remaining seven years of the license term.IkЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(b)(4). I The final and most favorable plan, available only to small businesses owned by members of minority groups or women, provides for interestonly payments for six years and payments of principal and interest amortized over the remaining four years of the license term.IlЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(b)(5). I  We proposed in the Notice to eliminate the special provisions based on an applicant's status as a minority or womenowned business in the event we found that the record was insufficient to sustain such provisions. We sought comment on whether we should provide for three installment payment plans based solely on financial size, as we did for the C block. We also requested comment on whether it is necessary to extend the most favorable C block payment terms to F block auction winners and, in particular, whether the sixyear interestonly period serves the public interest, given that the amounts bid for the 10 MHz licenses most likely will be lower than those bid for 30 MHz licenses in the C block auction.NmЍ See Notice at  55.N  Comments. The majority of commenters support the adoption of three installment payment plans as discussed in the Notice.nЍ Sprint Comments at 3; Conestoga Comments at 3; NCMC Comments at 10; Vanguard Comments at 3; Devon Comments at 8; MidPlains Comments at 23; PCS One, Inc. Comments at 12 ("PCS One"); PCIA Comments at 1314; WPCS Comments at 4; see also Leong Comments at 3 (recommending additional "very small business" category of licensees eligible for interestonly payments for eight years at 10year Tnote rate). TDS advocates extending installment payments to rural telephone companies also.ioЍ Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. Reply Comments at 4 ("TDS").i PCSD, which qualified as a minority and womanowned small business in the regional narrowband PCS auction and won five licenses, states that it found in that auction that, between bidding credits and installment payments, only installment payments provided a financial benefit. According to PCSD, this was the case because the prices paid for licenses with bidding credits in the regional narrowband PCS auction were equal to or higher than the prices companies paid for equivalent licenses without the credits.?pЍ PCSD Comments at 7.? PCSD believes that entities acquiring F block licenses will need a reduced payment schedule, and that none of the installment payment periods should be modified.5qЍ Id.5 Arguing that many bidders have reasonably expected that the F block licenses would be available on terms similar to those of the C block licenses, and have made business plans based on this expectation, DCR believes that the sixyear interestonly payment period used for the most favorable C block auction installment payment plan should also be employed for the most favorable F block plan.@rЍ DCR Comments at 89.@ Airlink argues that a sixyear deferral period is necessary for small businesses because most business plans show a six to eightyear period before a PCS provider becomes cash flow positive.IsЍ AirLink Reply Comments at 10.I Antigone contends that the C block installment payment provisions should be extended to the D, E, and F blocks. Antigone argues, however, that the Commission should allow optional partial prepayments in increments of $100,000.CtЍ Antigone Comments at 8.C   PersonalConnect, a beneficiary of the installment plan rules as a C block designated entity, believes that our current installment payment rules encourage undesirable speculation and risktaking since only 10 percent of the winning bid is paid as a down payment in the first six years under the most favorable plan.uuЍ PersonalConnect Communications, L.L.C. Comments at 3 ("PersonalConnect").u PersonalConnect suggests that shortening the period for interestonly payments to four years, in conjunction with increasing the down payment requirement to 25 percent, would dampen speculation while still providing opportunities for designated entities to win licenses.vЍ Id. But see Advanced Comments at 2 (advocating interestonly payments for eight or nine years to entities in "targeted" areas with high unemployment and crime). AT&T argues that the Commission should eliminate the small business provisions from the F block rules, but if such provisions are retained a simplified installment payment plan with a shorter interestonly period should be adopted.[wЍ AT&T Comments at 56; AT&T Reply Comments at 4.[  Decision. Based on our review of the record, we amend our F block rules concerning installment payments as set forth in the Notice. Thus, all small businesses, including those owned by minorities and women, will be eligible for the most favorable installment plan. We conclude that extending this installment payment plan to all small businesses will give minority and womenowned businesses an opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrumbased services. Moreover, this leveling up approach was upheld by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for the C block auction.OxЍ Omnipoint, 78 F.3d at 63334.O  We also conclude, however, that we should amend our rules to shorten the period during which F block auction winners eligible for this plan may make interestonly payments. For the reasons discussed below, the most favorable plan will have a twoyear interestonly payment period, rather than a sixyear interestonly period. The plan will provide for installments at a rate equal to tenyear U.S. Treasury obligations applicable on the date the license is granted, with payments of principal and interest amortized over the remaining eight years of the license term. Principal will be repaid as part of equal quarterly payments of interest and principal (as with a standard mortgage amortization schedule).  Entrepreneurs that are not small businesses will be eligible for installment payments as provided in Sections 24.716(b)(1) and 24.716(b)(2) of our rules. These rules provide for installments at a rate equal to tenyear U.S. Treasury obligations applicable on the date the license is granted plus 3.5 percent, with payments of principal and interest amortized over the license term for eligible licensees with gross revenues exceeding $75 million in each of the two preceding years. Eligible licensees with gross revenues not exceeding $75 million in each of the two preceding years may make installment payments at a rate equal to tenyear U.S. Treasury obligations applicable on the date the license is granted plus 2.5 percent, with interestonly payments for the first year and payments of interest and principal amortized over the remaining nine years of the license term.  We believe that a twoyear interestonly period with an interest rate equal to the tenyear U.S. Treasury rate and principal amortized over the remaining eight years of the license term provides small businesses with the appropriate level of U.S. government assisted financing to overcome the difficulties faced in accessing capital to compete in the PCS marketplace. We agree with PersonalConnect's argument that reducing the interestonly period will dampen speculation while still providing small businesses with the ability to obtain the necessary funds for construction and initial operation of their systems.JyЍ PersonalConnect Comments at 3.J However, we believe a twoyear interestonly period more effectively achieves these objectives than the fouryear period suggested by PersonalConnect.  Specifically, the twoyear interestonly period in the most favorable installment payment plan for the F block will allow small businesses two full years during which they can devote resources to business development and infrastructure costs rather than license costs. Upon completion of these two years of interestonly payments, licensees should be capable of beginning to make principal payments. We believe that an interestonly period longer than two years is not necessary to help small businesses compete in the PCS marketplace, especially with 10 MHz licenses. We initially established tiered installment payment plans that provided a twoyear interestonly period for small businesses and a fiveyear interestonly period for small businesses owned by minorities and/or women in order to allow these entities to concentrate their resources on infrastructure buildout.pzЍ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5593.p We subsequently extended the interestonly period for small businesses owned by women and/or minorities to six years from the date of license grant because under the five year benchmark, principal payments would come due at the same time the designated entity was permitted to transfer the license and immediately following the first buildout requirement. By deferring payment of principal an additional year, we intended to assist the designated entity in avoiding an unwanted sale in order to avoid payment of principal.{Ѝ Competitive Bidding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 45960. In light of Adarand, we later extended the sixyear interestonly provisions to all small business C block licensees.p|Ѝ Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 158.p The buildout requirements for 10 MHz licenses are more liberal than those for 30 MHz licenses, requiring only a onefourth population coverage or showing of substantial service within the first five years, as compared to the onethird population coverage required of 30 MHz licenses.B}Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.203.B Given these less burdensome requirements, we believe that a twoyear interestonly period will provide sufficient assistance to F block licensees by giving them a substantial period to devote resources to constructing their systems, while also encouraging them to provide service to the public quickly.  We also believe that a twoyear interestonly period (and other measures adopted herein) will deter speculation and insincere bidding. If licensees need to pay only a small percentage of their winning bid (10 percent for the C block and 20 percent for the F block) through year six of the license term, they will have a greater incentive to place speculative bids because the actual cost of the license is not recognized until late in the license term. We believe that shortening the interestonly period to two years will be likely to encourage bidding, business, and financial strategies based upon market forces rather than the financial terms of installment payment plans.  Finally, shortening the interestonly period to two years will not foreclose opportunities for small businesses to compete in PCS. The terms that the Commission is offering (two years interestonly, interest equal to the tenyear U.S. Treasury obligation, and financing on 80 percent of the license price) are extremely attractive compared to other terms small businesses may be able to obtain. This financing will result in significant capital cost savings and financial assistance to small businesses our original intent in offering installment financing.~Ѝ Implementation of Section 309(j) Competitive Bidding, Second Report and Order, PP Docket 93253, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2389 (1994) ("Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order"). Helping small businesses overcome the most significant hurdle to competition in the communications marketplace access to capital is a top priority of the Commission.Ѝ See, e.g., Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 558485. We believe the steps we have taken here further this objective. We note also that a two year interestonly period is consistent with terms we have offered in other auctions, notably MDS and 900 MHz SMR.wЍ See 47 C.F.R.  21.960(b)(3)(iii) and 47 C.F.R.  90.812(a)(2).w  We also conclude that we should amend the terms of our installment payments to provide for late payment fees. Therefore, when licensees are more than fifteen days late in their scheduled installment payments, we will charge a late payment fee equal to 5 percent of the amount of the past due payment. For example, if a $50,000 payment is due on June 1, then on June 16 $2,500 is due in addition to the payment. Without this late payment fee, licensees may not have adequate financial incentives to make installment payments on time. Licensees may therefore attempt to maximize their cash flow at the government's expense by paying late. The 5 percent payment we adopt here is an approximation of late payment fees applied in typical commercial lending transactions. Payments will be applied in the following order: late charges, interest charges, principal payments. 4. Bidding Credits  Background. Under our F block rules a small business is granted a 10 percent bidding credit,FЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.717(a). F a business that is owned by members of minority groups or women is granted a 15 percent bidding credit,FЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.717(b). F and a small business owned by members of minority groups or women is allowed to aggregate these bidding credits for a 25 percent bidding credit.FЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.717(c). F We proposed in the Notice to eliminate race and genderbased bidding credits in our F block rules if we found that the record was insufficient to withstand judicial review. We also sought comment on whether we should extend a single bidding credit to all small businesses as we did for the C block and, if so, how big that credit should be. We asked whether, as an alternative, we should offer tiered bidding credits for small businesses of different sizes. We tentatively concluded that, because the value of 10 MHz licenses may be lower than the value of 30 MHz licenses, a smaller bidding credit than we offered C block bidders may be appropriate for F block bidders. We also tentatively concluded that these lower expected values may attract smaller businesses, thus justifying a tiered bidding credit.DЍ Notice at  47.D  Comments. AirLink, the NY Coalition, Sprint, Conestoga, DCR, NatTel, MidPlains, PCS One, Western, and WPCS assert that the bidding credit used in the C block auction a 25 percent bidding credit for all small businesses should also be used in the F block auction.mЍ AirLink Comments at 14; NY Coalition Comments at 5; Sprint Comments at 3; Conestoga Comments at 3; DCR Comments at 8; NatTel Comments at 34; MidPlains Comments at 3; PCS One Comments at 1; Western Comments at 30; WPCS Comments at 4. See also Ondas Comments at 2 (arguing in favor of a 40 percent bidding credit).m DCR argues that many bidders have reasonably expected that the F block licenses would be available on terms similar to those of the C block licenses and have made business plans based on this expectation.AЍ DCR Comments at 89. A PersonalConnect claims that the 25 percent bidding credit, as opposed to installment payments, is the essential feature which will allow designated entities to attract investors.JЍ PersonalConnect Comments at 3.J  NCMC, on the other hand, encourages the Commission to adopt a twotiered bidding credit plan for small businesses participating in the F block auction, asserting that tiered bidding credits will advance Congress' goals of avoiding concentration of licenses and promoting the dissemination of licenses to a broad variety of applicants.@Ѝ NCMC Comments at 11.@ NCMC supports a 25 percent bidding credit for small businesses that have aggregate gross revenues under $15 million and a 15 percent bidding credit for small businesses with gross revenues between $15 million and $40 million.5Ѝ Id.5 PCIA also supports tiered bidding credits of 10, 15, and 25 percent, depending on the size of the small business.@Ѝ PCIA Comments at 13.@ ICGC and ONE suggest a tiered definition of small business such that firms with average annual gross sales of less than $5 million would receive a 40 percent bidding credit and firms with average annual gross sales of less than $11 million would receive a 25 percent bidding credit.Ѝ Integrated Communications Group Corp. Comments at 2 ("ICGC"); Opportunities Now Enterprises Inc. Comments at 13 ("ONE"). Mr. Harvey Leong asserts that businesses with less than $1 million in both revenues and assets should receive a 50 percent bidding credit.@Ѝ Leong Comments at 3.@ Finally, Advanced argues that entities located in "targeted" areas, such as high unemployment or high crime areas, should receive a 25 percent bidding credit, while entities outside these areas should receive a 10 percent bidding credit.CЍ Advanced Comments at 2.C  Devon urges the Commission to eliminate bidding credits and the related unjust enrichment provisions from the F block rules, asserting that the C block auction illustrates that they may discourage future participation of designated entities.@Ѝ Devon Comments at 4.@ Devon contends that bidders with bidding credits have generally been forced to pay a premium gross price for PCS licenses, while the net price has been roughly equivalent to the market price, thereby eviscerating any discounting impact on the license values.5Ѝ Id.5 Devon further contends that the unjust enrichment provisions penalize designated entities by requiring the recapture of the bidding credit even when no enrichment has occurred.=Ѝ Id. at 45.= Devon argues that within the entrepreneurs' block the installment payment plans provide adequate assurance that small businesses will be successful in obtaining licenses.;Ѝ Id. at 5.;  Decision. Consistent with our concerns about avoiding litigation based on Adarand, we will eliminate the race and genderbased aspects of our F block bidding credits. In place of these provisions, we adopt a twotiered bidding credit for small businesses, as proposed by NCMC. We agree with NCMC that a twotiered approach will promote dissemination of licenses to a broader variety of applicants than a 25 percent bidding credit for all small businesses, the approach we took for the C block. We believe that this tiered approach will encourage smaller businesses, possibly businesses that are very well suited to provide 10 MHz niche services, to participate in the F block auction. We also believe, in response to Devon's arguments, that a tiered approach enhances the discounting effect of bidding credits because not all entities receive the same benefit. We note that our original F block rules included bidding credits that were tiered although based on race and gender. We have also offered tiered bidding credits for small businesses in auctioning other services. In auctioning 900 MHz SMR licenses, for example, we provided a 15 percent bidding credit to very small businesses with average annual gross revenues of not more than $3 million and a 10 percent bidding credit to small businesses with average annual gross revenues of not more than $15 million.Ѝ Amendment of Parts 2 and 90 of the Commission's Rules to Provide for the Use of 200 Channels Outside the Designated Filing Areas in the 896901 MHz and the 935940 MHz Bands Allotted to the SMR Pool, Second Order on Reconsideration and Seventh Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 2639, at 27056 (1995)("Competitive Bidding Seventh Report and Order").   We find that NCMC's specific proposal strikes a good balance between offering added incentives to very small businesses and retaining some bidding credits for entities that received them in the C block. Under the modified rule, entities with average gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the past three years are eligible for a 25 percent bidding credit. Entities with average gross revenues of not more than $40 million for the past three years are eligible for a 15 percent bidding credit.  We also believe that the timing of our modification here, as compared to the modifications that we made in the Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, allows us to take a different approach than we took for the C block. When we modified our rules for the C block, we attempted to preserve the expectations and business strategies of applicants who had relied on their eligibility for a 25 percent bidding credit. The single 25 percent small business bidding credit adopted for the C block ensured that all prospective applicants were able to participate in the auction.zЍ See Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 161.z Entities interested in bidding on F block licenses have not had similar expectations in structuring their businesses or formulating strategies in reliance on the tiered bidding credits originally adopted.  5. Information Collection  In the Notice, we asked for comment on our proposal to continue to request that applicants provide information regarding minority and womenowned status in their shortform applications if we eliminated the race and genderbased provisions in our F block rules.DЍ Notice at  48.D All the comments that we received on this issue favored our proposal.qЍ Antigone Comments at 9; DCR Comments at 4; NatTel Comments at 4, n.3.q Thus, we will continue to request information regarding minority and womenowned status in the F block shortform applications. As we stated in the Notice, we believe that continuing to collect such information will assist us in analyzing applicant pools and auction results to determine whether we have promoted substantial participation in auctions by minorities and women, as we are directed by Congress, through the special provisions we make available to small businesses. This information will also assist us in preparing our report to Congress on the participation of designated entities in the auctions and in the provision of spectrumbased services.SЍ See 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(12)(D).S We also believe that such information will be relevant in developing a supplemental record should we find that special provisions for small businesses prove unsuccessful in encouraging the dissemination of licenses to a wide variety of applicants, including businesses owned by members of minority groups and women. B. Definitions 1. Small Business  Background. Under our current F block rules, a "small business" is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates and persons or entities that hold interests in such entity and their affiliates, has average gross revenues of not more than $40 million for the preceding three years.JЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.720(b)(1). J In the Notice, we proposed to keep this definition for the F block, which is also used for the C block, to allow C block small business licensees to benefit from the small business provisions of the F block.DЍ Notice at  50.D However, we expressed concern that this threshold might prevent C block winners from acquiring F block licenses because of the value of their C block licenses, and we requested comment on whether the value of a C block license should be part of the gross revenues calculation. We also requested comment on whether we should define and adopt rules for very small businesses, and whether we should modify or simplify the affiliation rules.  Comments. Most commenters support our proposal to continue to define entities with $40 million or less in gross revenues as small businesses.eЍ AirLink Comments at 1516; Auction Strategy Comments at 2; USIW Comments at 45; The Alliance Comments at 4; Radiofone Comments at 1112; DCR Comments at 8; Devon Comments at 10; Iowa Comments at 6: NatTel Comments at 4; NTCA Comments 45; NCMC Comments at 1112; Antigone Comments at 8; MidPlains Comments at 3.e Commenters advocating a change in our definition support using both lower financial testsЍ Point Comments at 2; Bray Comments at 2; New Dakota Investment Trust Comments at 67 ("New Dakota"); ICGC Comments at 2; ONE Comments at 1; Thompson PCS Systems, Inc. Comments at 3 ("TPCS"); Wireless 2000, Inc. Comments at 1 ("Wireless 2000"); Wireless Interactive Data Systems Comments at 1 ("WIDS"); Advanced Comments at 1; Ondas Comments at 2; Columbia Comments at 1. and higher financial testsЍ Vanguard Comments at 45 (proposing raising small business eligibility threshold to $350 million in average revenues and $700 million in total assets because of the capitalintensive nature of building a communications business). or looking at net worth and total assets rather than gross revenues.UЍ Mountain Solutions Comments at 9; TEC Comments at 58. TEC also argues, in the alternative, that we should prohibit attributable investment and significant loans by entities with a net worth over $30 million and total assets above $300 million averaged over the last three years. Id. at 8.U RAA proposes that any bidder intending to serve more than 5 million pops should not be considered a small business.aЍ Rendall and Associates Reply Comments at 23 ("RAA").a Other commenters support changes to the affiliation rules. CSCI advocates modifying the definition of publicly traded companies with widely dispersed voting power to eliminate the 15 percent single entity ownership limitation.Ѝ Community Service Communications, Inc. Comments at 68 ("CSCI"). See 47 C.F.R.  24.720(m). In other words, it requests that we allow publicly held companies in which a single person owns more than 15 percent of the equity to ignore its affiliates' and owners' revenues and assets for purposes of qualifying as a small business or entrepreneur. BellSouth supports redefining small businesses to promote the participation of very small businesses in spectrumbased services.EЍ BellSouth Comments at 12.E  The comments are equally split on the issue of whether the value of licenses won in the C block auction should be considered in determining whether an entity is a small business. Arguments in opposition to considering the value of C block licenses include the assertion that the value of these licenses is offset by the liability of payments to the U.S. Treasury;KЍ Auction Strategy Comments at 2.K that C block licensees plan to aggregate C and F block spectrum;Ѝ Alliance Comments at 4; NextWave Comments at 5; Western Comments at 28 and Reply Comments at 1718. that C block bidders' ineligibility to bid in the F block auction would unfairly limit them to acquiring 10 MHz licenses in the secondary market;AЍ Devon Comments at 11.A and that we intended for entities qualifying as entrepreneurs or small businesses to continue to qualify regardless of financial growth.Ѝ DCR Comments at 67; NextWave Comments at 45; Omnipoint Corp. Comments at 5 ("Omnipoint"); Western Comments at 28. See also Bear Sterns Reply Comments at 5. Arguments in favor of considering the value of C block licenses include: expanding the number of broadband licensees; improving opportunities for bidders that were unable to win licenses in previous broadband PCS auctions; and increasing opportunities for small businesses, including those owned by women and minorities.pЍ CIRI Comments at 811 (suggesting that any C block licensee that holds BTA licenses covering more than two percent of the national population should be ineligible for any small business preferences). See also Iowa Comments at 6; NatTel Comments at 4; NCMC Comments at 1112; Radiofone Reply Comments at 23; AirLink Reply Comments at 13 (stating that the Commission excluded reasonable business growth of a licensee for purposes of transactions outside the auction context, but has never done so for purposes of determining initial eligibility to participate in an auction).p   Decision. We will continue to define small businesses as those entities that have gross revenues of not more than $40 million. Maintaining our $40 million definition of small businesses avoids disruption to the business plans of potential bidders, particularly participants in the C block auction. Additionally, however, we define a second tier of small businesses, which we will refer to as "very small businesses," as entities that, together with their affiliates and persons or entities that hold interests in such entities and their affiliates, have average gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three years. Creation of this subcategory of small businesses enables us to tailor our benefits to better meet the needs of bidders likely to participate in the F block auction. Smaller license size may mean that smaller businesses are likely to participate in the F block auction. Thus, as discussed above, our goals can best be served by offering varying bidding credits depending on the applicant's size. We believe that BellSouth's concern about furthering the interests of very small businesses is addressed in the tiered bidding credits that we adopt herein.VЍ See supra  53.V We will not, however, redefine publicly traded companies with widely dispersed voting power to eliminate the 15 percent single entity ownership limitation as requested by CSCI. Applicants such as CSCI that believe that their individual ownership structures merit exemption from our general definition may request a waiver.  We decline to make special provisions for small business winners of C block licenses as requested by some commenters.Ѝ See, e.g., DCR Comments at 7 (C block winners applying for the F block should not be required to submit new statements of gross revenues and updated total assets, unless there has been a change in affiliation or attributable investors).  As a practical matter, C block small business winners will likely not have accrued substantial gross revenues by the time we auction the D, E, and F blocks. Therefore, most of these winners should continue to qualify as small businesses. On the other hand, if they have grown in size beyond our established financial cap, or, if they can no longer avail themselves of our exception to the affiliation rules,DЍ See supra  34.D they may no longer qualify as a small business. 2. Rural Telephone Company  Background. In the Notice, we sought comment on whether we should retain the current definition of rural telephone company or replace it with the definition contained in the 1996 Act.DЍ Notice at  52.D Our F block rules define a rural telephone company as "a local exchange carrier having 100,000 or fewer access lines, including all affiliates."Ѝ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5617; 47 C.F.R.  24.720(e). In adopting this definition and geographic partitioning provisions, we indicated that it would facilitate the rapid deployment of broadband PCS to rural areas without giving benefits to large companies that do not require special assistance."pЍ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5617.p The 1996 Act, which defines 'rural telephone company' to include a larger number of local exchange carriers, provides:  Rural telephone company.--The term 'rural telephone company' means a local exchange carrier operating entity to the extent that such entity-- (A) provides common carrier service to any local exchange carrier study area that does not include either-- ` ` (i) any incorporated place of 10,000 inhabitants or more, or any part thereof, based on the most recently available population statistics of the Bureau of the Census; or ` ` (ii) any territory, incorporated or unincorporated, included in an urbanized area, as defined by the Bureau of the Census as of August 10, 1993; (B) provides telephone exchange service, including exchange access, to fewer than 50,000 access lines; (C) provides telephone exchange service to any local exchange carrier study area with fewer than 100,000 access lines; or (D) has less than 15 percent of its access lines in communities of more than 50,000 on the date of enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.JЍ 47 U.S.C.  153 (37).J  Comments. Commenters are divided over whether the Commission should continue to use the definition of rural telephone company adopted in the Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order or the new definition contained in the 1996 Act. The PCS Coalition, the NY Coalition, USIW, the Alliance, and NTCA urge the Commission to retain its current definition.Ѝ PCS Coalition Comments at 1114; NY Coalition Comments at 67; USIW Comments at 6; Alliance Comments at 56; and NTCA Comments at 5. They contend that replacing the current definition with the 1996 Act's definition would extend benefits intended for smaller companies to larger carriers, undermining the goals of Section 309(j)(3)(B) and possibly enabling larger LECs to attempt to qualify as rural telephone companies.Ѝ PCS Coalition Comments at 1112; NY Coalition Comments at 9; and NTCA Comments at 5. They also argue that the definition contained in the 1996 Act does not expressly override or replace any definitions that currently exist and that are outside the scope of the Act.Ѝ PCS Coalition Comments at 1314; NY Coalition Comments at 7; USIW Comments at 6; Alliance Comments at 5; NTCA Comments at 5; RTC Comments at 7. Finally, they claim that many rural telephone companies have reasonably relied upon the current definition and have made their plans and formed their coalitions in reliance on this definition.aЍ PCS Coalition Comments at 14; Alliance Comments at 5.a  On the other hand, a number of commenters urge the Commission to amend its current definition of rural telephone company to conform with the definition contained in the 1996 Act.Ѝ ALLTEL Corp. Comments at 34 ("ALLTEL"); Auction Strategy Comments at 2; Conestoga Comments at 3; GTE Service Corp. Comments at 36 ("GTE"); MidPlains Comments at 34; and TDS Comments at 56; TDS Reply Comments at 3. Auction Strategy claims that the definition should be changed to promote conformity and ease of regulation.KЍ Auction Strategy Comments at 2.K GTE, Mid-Plains, TDS, and ALLTEL argue that the Commission should adopt the definition contained in the 1996 Act because it would increase the number of entities eligible for partitioning, which would help bring advanced service to rural areas more swiftly and increase the value of PCS licenses by increasing the number of entities qualified to acquire at least a portion of a license.Ѝ GTE Comments at 56; MidPlains Comments at 4; TDS Comments at 67; and ALLTEL Comments at 68. ALLTEL, Mid-Plains, and TDS also contend that the 1996 Act's definition of rural telephone company is a definition of general applicability, indicating that Congress intended for it to apply to the entire Communications Act.pЍ ALLTEL Comments at 3; MidPlains Comments at 34; TDS Comments at 5.p  RTC, while opposing adoption of the new statutory definition for the F block auction, proposes expanding the current definition of rural telephone company to all LECs with less than 120,000 access lines (including all affiliates).>Ѝ RTC Comments at 7.> Alternatively, if the Commission adopts the definition contained in the 1996 Act, RTC contends that newly enacted Section 251(f)(2) creates a de facto definition of rural telephone company limited to LECs "with fewer than 2 percent of the Nation's subscriber lines." Accordingly, LECs that serve fewer than 2 percent of the nation's subscriber lines, RTC proposes, should qualify as rural telephone companies for purposes of the Commission's PCS rules.EЍ RTC Comments at 7, n. 10.E  Decision. We agree with those commenters that support the Commission's use of the definition of rural telephone company contained in the 1996 Act. We find compelling the arguments of GTE and ALLTEL that this definition will increase the number of entities eligible for partitioning and expedite the delivery of advanced services to rural areas. Although this decision may result in larger rural telephone companies being eligible to partition licenses, we recognize that the number of access lines including those provided by rural telephone companies continues to grow rapidly as the uses of telecommunications services expand. Thus, most rural telephone companies will benefit from a definition that accounts for their growth. Indeed, as RTC points out, we previously increased the threshold number of access lines from 50,000 to 100,000 in order to reflect this growth, consistent with the purposes of Section 309(j)(3)(A).5Ѝ Id.5 We also believe that adopting the 1996 Act definition for purposes of Section 309(j) will promote uniformity of regulations and is therefore consistent with the mandate of this legislation of easing regulatory burdens and eliminating unnecessary regulation. We believe that it is also consistent with our proposal to expand the availability of partitioned licenses generally.JЍ See supra note 55.J  We agree with commenters who assert that the definition is one of general applicability. We therefore elect not to adopt RTC's proposed definition contained in Section 251(f)(2) of the 1996 Act. This definition applies to rural telephone companies only in the context of suspensions or modifications of the application of certain statutory requirements to rural carriers. Absent a specific definition of rural telephone company for purposes of Section 309(j), and reading the statute as a whole, we are constrained to adopt the more generalized definition. C. Extending Small Business Provisions to the D and E Blocks  Background. We requested comment in the Notice on whether we should extend installment payment plans to small businesses bidding on the D and E blocks. We tentatively concluded that extending installment payments to the D and E blocks could increase the chances for all small businesses, including those that are women and minorityowned, to win a D, E, or F block license and that it could increase opportunities for small businesses that are current PCS, cellular, or SMR licensees to obtain 10 MHz licenses that they could aggregate with their current licenses.DЍ Notice at  54.D  Comments. A majority of commenters advocate extending installment payment plans to small businesses in the D and E blocks.OЍ PCS Coalition Comments at 9; AirLink Comments at 12; Antigone Comments at 8; Point Comments at 3; Auction Strategy Comments at 2; Alliance Comments at 6; Phoenix Comments at 3; PersonalConnect Comments at 2; Radiofone Comments at 11; CIRI Comments at 3 & Reply Comments at 9; DCR Comments at 10; Devon Comments at 12; Gulfstream Comments at 34; NatTel Comments 45; NCMC Comments at 12; Omnipoint Comments at 2; TEC Comments at 12; ICGC Comments at 1; ONE Comments at 1; MidPlains Comments at 4; PCS One Comments at 1; RAA Reply Comments at 3; NTCA Reply Comments at 3; Columbia Comments at 1; Western Reply Comments at 19. See also, Iowa Comments at 2, 5; KMTel, L.L.C. Comments at 5 ("KMTel"); Mountain Solutions Comments at 78 (if we do not set aside these blocks for small businesses).O AirLink, for example, asserts that installment payments are particularly important in the D and E blocks because all bidders will be eligible to participate regardless of size.CЍ AirLink Comments at 12.C Omnipoint states that extending small business provisions to the D and E blocks will give small businesses a greater opportunity to aggregate 10 MHz licenses.FЍ Omnipoint Comments at 34.F Many commenters also propose extending bidding credits to the D and E blocks.vЍ PCS Coalition Comments at 9; USIW Comments at 67; Alliance Comments at 7 (also proposes that these provisions be extended to rural telephone companies); Phoenix Comments at 3; PersonalConnect Comments at 2; Radiofone Comments at 11; CIRI Comments at 34; DCR Comments at 10; Gulfstream Comments at 34; KMTel Comments at 5; NatTel Comments 45; NCMC Comments at 12; Omnipoint Comments at 2; ICGC Comments at 1; ONE Comments at 1; Mountain Solutions Comments at 7 (on condition that D and E blocks are not setasides); Wireless 2000 Comments at 2. See also Iowa Comments at 2, 5.v֌ Commenters opposing the extension of installment payment plans to the D and E blocks argue primarily that small businesses receive ample opportunity to acquire 10 MHz licenses in the F block and that the market should decide the most efficient use of the remaining spectrum.Ѝ Sprint Comments at 7; BellSouth Comments at 14; US West Comments at 2; TDS Comments at 89. BellSouth argues that our spectrum allocation plan for broadband PCS, including the C and F block setasides, satisfies Congressional intent regarding designated entities.JЍ BellSouth Reply Comments at 6.J GWI argues that bidders in the C block auction valued the licenses in that auction based, in part, on the belief that the C block would be the only opportunity to rely on small business provisions to acquire 30 MHz broadband PCS licenses.[Ѝ General Wireless, Inc. Comments at 34 ("GWI").[ It believes that offering an installment payment plan to small businesses on D and E block licenses could decrease the value of C block licenses at a time when C block licensees will be attempting to secure financing for their buildout.5Ѝ Id.5 Other arguments in opposition to extending installment payments to the D and E blocks are that this approach would frustrate bidders' expectations created by the existing rules;mЍ AT&T Comments at 6; GWI Comments at 23; TDS Reply Comments at 6.m it calls into question the rationale for the entrepreneurs' block;EЍ BellSouth Comments at 14.E instead of awarding licenses to the entities that value them the most, it could result in awarding licenses to entities that value the government's loans the most;Ѝ US West Comments at 2; see also Allied Comments at 5 and AT&T Reply Comments at 4. and it has given C block winners a windfall that should not be repeated in future auctions.CЍ Western Comments at 30.C  Decision. We decline to extend installment payment plans or any other special provisions to small businesses bidding on the D and E blocks. We believe that the special provisions for small businesses in the F block rules sufficiently further our objective of encouraging wide dissemination of broadband PCS licenses.|Ѝ Competitive Bidding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 458.| We note that in the recently completed C block auction, almost 90 entrepreneurs and small businesses won 30 MHz broadband PCS licenses.Ѝ BDPCS, in the C block auction, defaulted on its 17 licenses. See Emergency Petition for Waiver of Deadline for Submission of Down Payment for the Broadband PCS C Block Auction filed by BDPCS, Inc., Order, DA 96811 (May 20, 1996)("BDPCS Order") recon. denied, Order on Reconsideration, DA 96874 (May 30, 1996). See also National Telecom PCS, Inc. Request for Waiver of Withdrawal Payment, Order, DA 96873 (May 30, 1996) ("NatTel Order"). Our F block rules will create additional opportunities for entrepreneurs and small businesses to acquire 10 MHz licenses. Further, since the F block is an entrepreneurs' block, it guarantees that one third of the 10 MHz broadband PCS licenses will be assigned to entrepreneurs and small businesses. Larger entities are prevented from acquiring F block licenses.  Commenters contend that we would undermine the justification for the F block as an entrepreneurs' block if we were to open the D and E blocks to special provisions for small businesses.Ѝ See, e.g., AT&T Comments at 6; GWI Comments at 23; BellSouth Comments at 2; TDS Reply Comments at 6. We agree and believe that departing from our original plan to establish two contiguous blocks of broadband PCS spectrum for the exclusive use of entrepreneurs and small businesses is not warranted. We set aside one third of broadband PCS spectrum for small businesses and we believe this fulfills our obligation under Section 309(j). Many advocates of extending small business provisions to the D and E blocks argue that it will enhance competition for those licenses. We believe, however, that the auction of these two blocks will be very competitive, with participation by local exchange carriers, cellular carriers, PCS carriers, cable companies, public utilities, entrepreneurs and small businesses all of whom are eligible to bid for these licenses.  D. Adjusting Payment Provisions for 10 MHz Licenses  Background. We recognized in the Notice that winning bids for the D, E, and F block licenses, which authorize the use of 10 MHz, could be lower than those for the 30 MHz A, B, and C block licenses. Accordingly, we sought comment on whether we should adjust the terms of our installment financing provisions to reflect the expected lower values of the 10 MHz licenses. Similarly, we sought comment on whether our F block rules establishing discounted upfront payments and reduced down payments for entrepreneurs should be adjusted. Our rules currently require participants in the F block auction to submit an upfront payment of $.015 per MHz per pop (or per bidding unit) for the maximum number of licenses (in terms of bidding units) on which they intend to bid.Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.716(a)(1). The term "MHzpops" is defined as the number of megahertz of the spectrum block multiplied by the population of the relevant service area. This measurement may also be referred to as "bidding units." The MHzpops/bidding units measurement is used in the activity rules, stage transition rules, and bid increment rules.  Winning bidders in entrepreneurs' block auctions are required to supplement their upfront payment with a down payment sufficient to bring their total deposits up to 10 percent of their winning bid(s).Ѝ See Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5593. See also 47 C.F.R.  24.711(a)(2) and 47 C.F.R.  24.716(a)(2). Under our current rules, a winning bidder in the F block auction would be required to submit five percent of its net winning bid within five days of the close of the auction, and the remainder within five days of the award of the license.GЍ 47 C.F.R  24.716(a)(2).G  Comments. Some commenters took issue with our statement that winning bids for the D, E, and F blocks, because they are for 10 MHz licenses, could be lower than those for the 30 MHz A, B, and C blocks, generally arguing that license valuation is complex and subjective.Ѝ AirLink Comments at 13; Alliance Comments at 7; NatTel Comments at 3. See also PCIA Comments at 1112. For this reason, several commenters objected to adjusting the installment payment plans, upfront payments, or down payments.lЍ Sprint Comments at 34; Auction Strategy Comments at 3; USIW Comments at 7; Alliance Comments at 7; Liberty Comments at 78; Antigone Comments at 8; NCMC Comments at 10; MidPlains Comments at 45; see also NY Coalition Comments at 56; TPCS Comments at 4; Wireless 2000 Comments at 2; PCIA Reply Comments at 34.l In contrast, Conestoga asserted that upfront payments and down payments should be lowered to reflect the expected lower value of 10 MHz licenses.Ѝ Conestoga Comments at 3; see also Leong Comments at 3 (arguing that a 5 percent down payment should apply for very small businesses); WPCS Comments at 6.  NCMC believes that it is not necessary to increase the down payment and upfront payment requirement because the Commission has not seen significant bidder default outside of IVDS.dЍ NCMC Comments at 14; see also PCIA Comments at 14.d AirLink, on the other hand, supports increased upfront and down payments because they reduce the likelihood of bidder default.Ѝ AirLink Comments at 810. See also CIRI Reply Comments at 5; NextWave Reply Comments at 7. Western advocates a substantially increased upfront payment and suggests $.20 per MHzpop.dЍ Western Comments at 3132 n.29 and Reply Comments at 21.d AT&T also urges the Commission to increase the upfront payment amount for all three spectrum blocks to ensure the availability of adequate funds to cover default payments and suggests a $.10 per MHzpop upfront payment.gЍ AT&T Comments at 8; but see NTCA Reply Comments at 3.g AT&T further proposes that we require applicants to supplement their upfront payments during the auction whenever their payment balances fall below a certain percentage of their bids.Ѝ AT&T Comments at 8; see also Go Communications Corp. Comments at 3 ("Go"). But see PersonalConnect Reply Comments at 3. Ľ Go argues that bidders should be required to submit an upfront payment equal to 20 percent of the total amount bid during auction.=Ѝ Go Comments at 1.= To simplify crossover bidding by small businesses in the D and E blocks, Auction Strategy believes that upfront payments should be the same for all blocks and bidder types.KЍ Auction Strategy Comments at 4.K With respect to the down payment requirement, Sprint advocates a 20 percent requirement for F block winners;AЍ Sprint Comments at 4.A PersonalConnect suggests 25 percent;JЍ PersonalConnect Comments at 3.J and CIRI suggests 30 percent.?Ѝ CIRI Comments at 7.?  Decision. We do not dispute commenters' contentions that it is difficult to predict how high bids will go for the 10 MHz licenses given the disparity between the prices paid for the A and B block licenses and the high bids for the C block licenses. Whether the ultimate D, E, and F block bids are higher or lower than those for the 30 MHz licenses, however, we conclude that our installment payment plans and our upfront payment and down payment requirements should be adjusted. These adjustments are based primarily on the fact that license values in the A, B, and C blocks have exceeded expectations. We are also concerned, based on BDPCS's default in the C block auction, that there is a need to obtain a higher payment up front to guard against default.qЍ See BDPCS Order; see also NatTel Order.q  We therefore modify the upfront payment requirement for the F block to raise it to the same level as the D and E block requirement and eliminate the discount previously provided to entrepreneurs. We originally discounted upfront payments for entrepreneurs because their down payment requirement was low (5 percent) and we were concerned that if we required them to pay upfront payments larger than the required down payment we might discourage their participation.pЍ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5600.p Our experience to date, however, indicates that we have underestimated the value of spectrum and that upfront payments have not created a barrier to entrepreneur participation in our auctions. We also agree with Auction Strategy that requiring a uniform upfront payment (per bidding unit) of all bidders for D, E, and F block licenses will greatly simplify the auction process for bidders interested in bidding on two or more of the blocks. We also believe that if we conduct a single simultaneous multiple round auction of the D, E, and F block licenses, it is necessary for operational reasons to have the same upfront payment and activity requirements across all three blocks.  Further, because we want our payment terms to more accurately reflect the value of the licenses, we will raise the upfront payment requirement for all three blocks. We believe that this action is consistent with our policy reason for requiring upfront payments to deter insincere and speculative bidding and to ensure that bidders have the financial capability to build out their systems.qЍ Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 2379.q Our formula for calculating upfront payments was intended to approximate 5 percent of the estimated license value.9Ѝ See Id.9 Based on the license values established in the completed PCS auctions, however, the formula of $0.02 per MHzpop underestimates actual value. We also agree with AT&T's argument that increased upfront payments will accomplish the objective of providing adequate funds to cover default payments. We note, for example, that in the cases of the BDPCS and NatTel's defaults, we have insufficient funds on hand to cover their default payments.<Ѝ BDPCS paid an upfront payment of $7 million. NatTel paid an upfront payment of $50,000. Under 47 C.F.R.  1.2104(g)(2) their default payment is the difference between the amount that they bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time the license is offered for auction, plus 3 percent of the subsequent winning bid. If the subsequent winning bid exceeds their defaulting bids, the 3 percent payment will be calculated based on their defaulting bid amount. Because their default payments cannot be determined yet, they are required to make a deposit of 20 percent of their defaulting bid. See Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at n. 51. Therefore, BDPCS is required to deposit $174,756,782.55 and NatTel is required to deposit $82,200.15.< AT&T suggests $.10 per MHzpop as the upfront payment for the D, E, and F blocks. We choose, however, to adopt an upfront payment of $.06 per MHzpop for the D, E, and F blocks. Based on our analysis of the prices paid in the C block auction, we believe that such an upfront payment is sufficient to ensure sincere bidding and guard against defaults. This upfront payment for the D, E, and F blocks equals approximately 5 percent of the market value of the C block licenses.jЍ We note that increasing the upfront payments for the D, E, and F blocks provides an indirect benefit to small businesses because it will raise more funds for the Telecommunications Development Fund, which exists to assist small businesses through loans, investments, or other extensions of credit. 47 U.S.C.  614.j We also delegate authority to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau to modify the upfront payment requirement for any C block licenses that are reauctioned in the future. We note that we also favor the approach suggested by AT&T that would require applicants to supplement their upfront payments during the auction to ensure that their payment is a certain percentage of their bids. Operationally we cannot implement this proposal at this time, but we will look for ways to implement it in future auctions.   For similar reasons, we also modify our rule governing down payments for the F block. We find that a 20 percent down payment, the same down payment that is required of D and E block auction winners, should be required of F block winners. Under this approach, F block entrepreneurs and small businesses will be required to supplement their upfront payments to bring their total payment to 10 percent of their winning bid within 5 business days of the close of the auction. Prior to licensing, they will be required to pay an additional 10 percent. The government will then finance the remaining 80 percent of the purchase price. We believe an increased down payment will provide us with strong assurance against default and sufficient funds to cover default payments in the unlikely event of default.Ѝ See Sprint Comments at 4 (a higher down payment requirement "could serve as a valuable reality check"); PersonalConnect Comments at 3 (increasing down payment "would dampen . . . speculation"). Increasing the amount of the bidder's funds at risk in the event of default discourages insincere bidding and therefore increases the likelihood that licenses are awarded to parties who are best able to serve the public.  E. Rules Regarding the Holding of Licenses  Background. Current rules allow no transfers or assignments of entrepreneurs' block licenses in the first three years after licensing and permit transfers and assignments to entrepreneurs in years four and five with no restrictions after year five.BЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.839.B In the Notice, we tentatively concluded that our current transfer restrictions for F block licensees may be too restrictive and we proposed to amend the holding requirement to let all F block licensees transfer their licenses within the first three years to an entity that qualifies as an entrepreneur.DЍ Notice at  62.D   Comments. Most commenters agree with our proposal to relax the transfer restrictions for F block licensees.PЍ Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association Comments at 3 ("CTIA"); Alliance Comments at 8; DCR Comments at 12; Devon Comments at 14; GWI Comments at 67; NatTel Comments at 5; NCMC Comments at 14; Wireless 2000 Comments at 2; WIDS Comments at 1; WPCS Comments at 7; PCIA Comments at 14.P For example, Devon argues in favor of this proposal because it believes that it will ensure that spectrum is being used efficiently and that the public is being adequately served.@Ѝ Devon Comments at 14@ Several commenters suggest that we should expand our proposal to include C block licensees also.Ѝ US West Comments at 8; GWI Comments at 78; PersonalConnect Comments at 4; Bear Stearns & Co., Inc. Reply Comments at 2 ("Bear Stearns"). For example, GWI asserts that because the C block auction and the F block auction are designed to serve the same statutory objective of ensuring opportunities for small businesses, the Commission's proposed change should apply to both blocks.@Ѝ GWI Comments at 78.@ Bear Stearns advocates relaxing the transfer restriction to give potential lenders and investors more assurance that in case of financial distress, it will be possible to replace the original entrepreneur with another qualifying entrepreneur in advance of an actual default. Other alternatives to our proposed rule change offered by commenters include eliminating the threeyear restriction completely;eЍ Auction Strategy Comments at 3; PCIA Reply Comments at 5.e instituting a permanent requirement that licenses be transferred only to like entities;0Ѝ TEC Comments at 910; Iowa Comments at 3; Mountain Solutions Comments at 45. See also Antigone Comments at 9 (proposing that we amend the transfer restrictions for the C and F blocks to allow transfers at any time to womencontrolled small businesses).0 and allowing transfers to small and very small businesses but not to entrepreneurs or other entities.CЍ Columbia Comments at 2.C Further, KMTel proposes that we eliminate the unjust enrichment provisions for the C block contained in Sections 24.711(e) and 24.712(d) of our rules because bidders have effectively "bid away" the discounts.@Ѝ KMTel Comments at 6.@ Finally, DCR requests that we clarify that our transfer restriction does not apply to pro forma transfers or assignments.Ѝ DCR Comments at 12. See also PCS Mobile America, Inc., Request for Declaratory Ruling, May 8, 1996 (requesting a declaratory ruling concerning the application of Section 24.839 to pro forma assignments of licenses).  AirLink and Conestoga, on the other hand, oppose our proposal because they believe that it will fuel speculation and possibly collusion.^Ѝ AirLink Comments at 16; Conestoga Comments at 34.^ Sprint argues in favor of the current rule because it believes that it is not too restrictive and that it should be kept consistent with the C block rule.AЍ Sprint Comments at 6.A  Decision. We will relax the holding requirement for the F block auction winners. Specifically, we will modify the rule to permit transfers and assignments of licenses to other entrepreneurs, including small businesses, in the first five years after license grant. We further agree with GWI and Bear Stearns that it is appropriate to make the same rule change for the C block. We believe that modifying the rule in this manner provides entrepreneurs' block winners with flexibility to engage in market transactions that do not undermine our stated objective of promoting a diverse and competitive PCS market.   Our holding rule was established to ensure that designated entities do not take advantage of special entrepreneurs' block provisions by immediately assigning or transferring control of their licenses to nonentrepreneurs. We indicated that trafficking of licenses in this manner would unjustly enrich the auction winners and would undermine the congressional objective of giving designated entities the opportunity to provide spectrumbased services.pЍ Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 5588.p After considering the record in this proceeding, we conclude that allowing transfers and assignments in the first five years but only to entrepreneurs provides a sufficient safeguard to satisfy our concerns. A restriction on transfers and assignments for five years, rather than three years, ensures that an entrepreneur will hold and build out the license until the first construction benchmark. We also have the experience of the C block auction behind us, and understand that our strict holding requirements may actually be hampering the ability of entrepreneurs to attract the capital necessary to construct and operate their systems. In particular, lenders and investors have expressed concern about the need for more flexibility in the event of financial distress and default. Because we do not want investors to shy away from financing C and F block winners due to such concerns, we modify our holding rule today in a manner that continues to promote small and entrepreneurial ownership in broadband PCS licenses.   We believe that our amendment to the holding requirement serves the public interest by helping to ensure rapid and uninterrupted service to the public. We agree with Bear Stearns that marketoriented solutions in the event of financial distress will help avoid PCS license defaults to the Commission and the accompanying investor and/or service disruption that such defaults engender.|Ѝ Bear Stearns Reply Comments at 4. See also North Coast Comments at 1415.| Marketoriented solutions to problems of financial distress will often be preferable to the FCC reclaiming and reauctioning licenses, and we believe this amendment will promote such a result by allowing transfers to entrepreneurs who may be better prepared than the original licensee to construct and provide service.Ѝ See, e.g., Competitive Bidding Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd at 471 (lenders and entrepreneurs' block licensees are free to agree contractually to their own terms regarding situations where the licensee has defaulted on the Commission's installment payment program, and possibly other obligations). See also Letter from Cook Inlet Communications to William E. Kennard, April 22, 1996 (suggesting plans for dealing with C block defaults). We thus amend Section 24.839 of our rules to permit the transfer of entrepreneurs' block licenses in the first five years to any entity that either holds other entrepreneurs' block licenses (and thus at the time of auction satisfied the entrepreneurs' block criteria) or that satisfies the criteria at the time of transfer. There will be no restrictions on transfers after the fifth year. We note, however, that our unjust enrichment provisions will continue to apply as before.Ѝ See 47 C.F.R.  24.711(c) and 24.712(d) and 47 C.F.R.  24.716(c) and 24.717(d). We further amend our holding rule to exempt pro forma transfers and assignments because trafficking concerns do not exist under such circumstances.Ѝ See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Third Report and Order, GN Docket 93252, 9 FCC Rcd 7988, 8160 (1994) ("CMRS Third Report and Order"). qDIII. The Cincinnati Bell Remand A. The Cellular/PCS Crossownership Rule   Background. In light of the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Cincinnati Bell remanding the Commission's rule limiting cellular operators' eligibility for PCS licenses, we asked for comment on whether our cellular/PCS crossownership rule should be relaxed or retained. Under this rule, no cellular licensee may be granted a license for more than 10 MHz of broadband PCS spectrum prior to the year 2000 if the grant will result in a significant overlap of a cellular licensee's Cellular Geographic Service Area ("CGSA") and the PCS service area.`Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.204(a). "Significant overlap" occurs when 10 percent or more of the population of the PCS service area is contained within the CGSA. 47 C.F.R.  24.204(c). A CGSA is the composite of the service areas of all of the cells in the system, with certain exceptions. 47 C.F.R.  22.903.` After the year 2000, cellular licensees will be allowed to obtain a grant of 15 MHz of PCS spectrum in an area that overlaps significantly with their CGSA.GЍ 47 C.F.R.  24.204(b). G We asked commenters to address whether there are reasons for maintaining the separate cellular/PCS crossownership provisions or the 40 MHz PCS spectrum cap,Ѝ Under Section 24.229 of our rules, broadband PCS licensees may not have an ownership interest in frequency blocks that total more than 40 MHz and serve the same geographic area. 47 C.F.R.  24.229(c). or, on the other hand, whether we should eliminate these caps in favor of a single, more relaxed 45 MHz CMRS cap.lЍ Under Section 20.6 of our rules, no licensee in the broadband PCS, cellular, or SMR services regulated as CMRS may have an attributable interest in a total of more than 45 MHz of licensed broadband PCS, cellular and SMR spectrum regulated as CMRS with significant overlap in any geographic area. 47 C.F.R.  20.6(a).l  Comments. Most commenters support relaxing and simplifying our cellular/PCS ownership limitations by implementing a single spectrum cap.Ѝ See PCS Coalition Comments at 15; CTIA Comments at 24; Cellular Communications of Puerto Rico, Inc. Comments at 26 ("CCPR"); AT&T Comments at 9; BellSouth Comments at 310; Alliance Comments at 89; Vanguard Comments at 5; ALLTEL Comments at 89; PersonalConnect Comments at 4; RTC Comments at 89; Western Comments at 7; NextWave Reply Comments at 78. See also TPCS Comments at 4. A majority of those commenters that support a single cap suggest eliminating the cellular/PCS and general PCS spectrum caps in favor of the single 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap.Ѝ See PCS Coalition Comments at 15; CTIA Comments at 24; CCPR Comments at 56; AT&T Comments at 9; BellSouth Comments at 310; Alliance Comments at 89; Vanguard Comments at 5; ALLTEL Comments at 89 (supporting a single modified Part 20 spectrum cap under which any noncontrolling interest of 49% or less would be noncontrolling interest); NextWave Reply Comments at 78. See also GTE Comments at 89. Such commenters believe that the 45 MHz spectrum cap for all CMRS is an adequate check on the power of cellular licensees to influence the broadband PCS market.rЍ Coalition Comments at 15; Vanguard Comments at 5; GTE Comments at 89.r More specifically, they argue that there is little risk that a cellular licensee will exert undue market power if allowed to acquire 20 MHz of broadband PCS spectrum.Ѝ CTIA Comments at 4; AT&T Comments at 9 and Reply Comments at 67; PCS Coalition Comments at 15. For instance, GTE argues that the high cost of acquiring PCS licenses and constructing systems will adequately deter cellular companies from acquiring such licenses purely to prevent competition.>Ѝ GTE Comments at 8.> Additionally, CTIA argues that the risk to innovation by limiting cellular providers' participation in broadband PCS is a greater concern than the risk of increased market concentration or undue market power. CTIA asserts further that relaxing cellular carriers' ownership restrictions would be good for consumers because it would result in better service and lower prices.lЍ CTIA Comments at 56 (citing Charles River Associates Analysis).l CCPR asserts that, with two cellular licensees, enhanced SMR, mobile satellite service, and at least three facilitiesbased PCS market entrants soon to be in every service area, the competition in mobile telephony promises to be frenzied and true price competition among mobile telephony providers exists.?Ѝ CCPR Comments at 2.? According to BellSouth, the 45 MHz CMRS cap will prevent cellular carriers from exerting undue market power and will not give cellular carriers a competitive advantage because it will ensure that there will be at least five separate broadband CMRS providers in each market.DЍ BellSouth Comments at 7.D   CTIA suggests that if a single 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap is maintained, the percentage of population overlap between service areas which triggers this rule should be increased from 10 percent to 40 percent.CЍ CTIA Comments at 1213.C CTIA argues that the overlap restriction should be relaxed because the risk of collusion among competitors is lower than is first apparent.?Ѝ CTIA Comments at 6.? CTIA further contends that in order for the weighted average market share of a cellular licensee acquiring a 30 MHz PCS license to exceed the 23.5 percent market share allowed a noncellular licensee under the 40 MHz PCS cap, the population overlap would have to exceed 40 percent.CЍ CTIA Comments at 1213.C The Alliance proposes that MTA pops be used to calculate overlap for BTA licensees who own or acquire cellular systems within that BTA.EЍ Alliance Comments at 89.E Western argues that the 10 percent standard for population overlap should be raised to at least 20 percent.HЍ Western Reply Comments at 7.H Western contends that permitting cellular licensees to dovetail the irregular boundaries of cellular markets with PCS markets would promote seamless wireless coverage since a PCS licensee that already provides service in rural areas on its cellular facilities is more likely to provide seamless coverage and provide wireless service to rural areas than noncellular licensees.FЍ Western Comments at 1518.F ` `   Radiofone asserts that the Commission should eliminate the cellular/PCS crossownership rule because there is no evidence to support such a rule, and that the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap should also be eliminated because it forecloses businesses such as Radiofone from obtaining a 30 MHz PCS license.vЍ Radiofone Comments at 15; see also BellSouth Reply Comments at 23.v Radiofone contends that limiting cellular carriers to 20 MHz of PCS spectrum under the 45 MHz cap is as arbitrary as limiting them to 10 MHz under the cellular/PCS crossownership rule,DЍ Radiofone Comments at 3.D and that the cap should be eliminated for all PCS auctions.^Ѝ  Id. See also Western Comments at 78.^ Radiofone also argues that changes in the spectrum caps should be applied to all of the broadband PCS licenses in the MTAs and BTAs where Radiofone and its affiliates provide cellular service.NЍ Radiofone Reply Comments at 1213.N GTE also opposes any CMRS spectrum aggregation limits on the grounds that they unduly restrain legitimate business activities and are not supported by any evidence. GTE asserts, however, that if the Commission adopts a cap, the 45 MHz CMRS cap is sufficient on its own to ensure diversity of ownership.@Ѝ GTE Comments at 89.@  APC argues that the proposal to eliminate the 40 MHz PCS spectrum cap is not called for either by Cincinnati Bell or by current marketplace conditions.{Ѝ Sprint Spectrum & American Personal Communications Reply Comments at 1 ("APC").{ APC contends that the 40 MHz cap has been successful in promoting competition, as shown by the numerous new market entrants that have emerged to bid aggressively on the 30 MHz PCS licenses.; Ѝ Id. at 4.; APC further argues that changing the rules at this late juncture would undermine the companies' reliance on the rules.; Ѝ Id. at 5.; Gulfstream also argues that A, B, and C block licensees should not be allowed to obtain a 10 MHz PCS license because this would encourage spectrum warehousing.E Ѝ Gulfstream Comments at 8.E   Several commenters contend that the existing crossownership rule should be retained. Ѝ See Sprint Comments at 9; TEC Comments at 13; Conestoga Comments at 4; CIRI Comments at 1112; DCR Comments at 1214; Mountain Solutions Comments at 1011; RAA Comments at 12; Bray Comments at 2; TDS Comments at 4 and Reply Comments at 23; RAA Reply Comments at 3; Ameritech Reply Comments at 2; OmniPoint Reply Comments at 610; CIRI Reply Comments at 8; PCIA Reply Comments at 6; Columbia Comments at 2. Sprint argues that liberalizing the rules after they have been in effect during the A, B, and C block auctions could seriously disadvantage entities that made business decisions based on the existing caps and thus invite legal challenge. Ѝ Sprint Comments at 9; Sprint Reply Comments at 4; see also TDS Reply Comments at 2; Ameritech Reply Comments at 23. TEC believes that the current rules ensure a competitive market since cellular licensees are the only companies providing largescale wireless telephone service to the public and PCS is a potential competitor in this market.jЍ TEC Comments at 1314. See also CIRI Comments at 1112.j DCR asserts that cellular companies would have a distinct advantage over small companies if their entry into PCS were not restricted because cellular companies already have name recognition, existing systems, and the use of free spectrum.BЍ DCR Comments at 1314.B DCR also argues that a cellular provider is more likely to use its PCS license to offer new services in a new market where it has no preexisting infrastructure of its own than in a geographic area where it has existing infrastructure and may instead expand its cellular subscriber base.HЍ DCR Reply Comments at 1011.H OmniPoint contends that the cellular/PCS crossownership rule is still needed because cellular providers still maintain substantial market power and advantages over new entrants, such as a strong customer base, duopoly profits for reinvestment in system infrastructure, and greater flexibility and opportunities for site locations.JЍ OmniPoint Reply Comments at 9.J Cox argues that removing the cellular/PCS crossownership cap or expanding the existing cap threatens the development of PCS as a standalone competitor to cellular and could relegate it to secondary status as a complementary service to cellular. Cox also argues that any move to adopt a single CMRS spectrum cap and eliminate the PCS and cellular/PCS spectrum caps must address the fact that while cellular providers could easily aggregate PCS spectrum to reach the CMRS cap with two 10 MHz PCS licenses, PCS providers will be able to acquire the same amount of spectrum only if they aggregate SMR frequencies.cЍ Cox Communications, Inc. Reply Comments at 46 ("Cox").c NCMC argues that relaxation of the existing caps would only encourage warehousing of CMRS spectrum.DЍ NCMC Reply Comment at 9.D   KMTel and NCMC suggest that the Commission tighten its cellular/PCS crossownership rule and PCS spectrum cap. Both commenters support prohibiting cellular companies from holding any D, E, and F block PCS licenses where they already have cellular interests.UЍ KMTel Comments at 7; NCMC Comments at 16.U NCMC argues that the C block auction results provide new evidence that the Commission has not avoided excessive concentration of ownership or ensured the dissemination of licenses to a wide variety of applicants.CЍ NCMC Comments at 1718.C  PersonalConnect and NCMC argue that the CMRS cap should be reduced to a 35 MHz limit.RЍ PersonalConnect Reply Comments at 34.R NCMC contends that a 35 MHz cap would put all CMRS providers on level footing.EЍ NCMC Reply Comments at 9.E  Decision. We agree with the majority of commenters that a spectrum cap is necessary in order to avoid excessive concentration of licenses and promote and preserve competition in the CMRS marketplace. We thus decline to accept the suggestions of Radiofone and GTE that we eliminate all limitations on the amount of spectrum a single entity (or affiliated entities) may acquire. For the reasons set forth below, we will maintain the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap and eliminate the PCS and cellular/PCS spectrum caps. Although we eliminate the 35 MHz cellular/PCS spectrum cap remanded by the Sixth Circuit in favor of the less restrictive 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap,Ѝ The 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap was not before the court in the Cincinnati Bell case. 69 F.3d at 765, n. 6. we also provide below additional economic support for limits on ownership of CMRS licensees.   We adopted the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap in the CMRS Third Report and Order in order to "discourage anticompetitive behavior while at the same time maintaining incentives for innovation and efficiency."aЍ CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 8105.a We were concerned that "excessive aggregation [of spectrum] by any one of several CMRS licensees could reduce competition by precluding entry by other service providers and might thus confer excessive market power on incumbents.">Ѝ Id. at 8101.> The continuation of the 45 MHz spectrum cap will promote competition and prevent anticompetitive horizontal concentration in the CMRS business. Up to a point, horizontal concentration can allow efficiencies and economies that would not be achievable otherwise, and can therefore be procompetitive, proconsumer, and in the public interest. At some point, however, horizontal concentration starts to work against those goals because it results in fewer competitors, less innovation and experimentation, higher prices and lower quality, and these disadvantages outweigh any advantages in terms of economies and efficiency.  For determining when concentration reduces competition to an undesirable level, one accepted tool is the HerfindahlHirschman Index ("HHI"), which is used in the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines to measure market concentration.Ѝ See 1992 Department of Justice Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)  20,569, 1.5 ("DOJ/FTC Guidelines"). It has been accepted by courts and this Commission in numerous cases as a preliminary test of permissible and impermissible horizontal concentration.PЍ See, e.g., Craig O. McCaw, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 5836, 585657 (1994), recon. denied, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd 11786 (1996), aff'd sub nom. SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995).P We find the HHI to be useful in the present situation because we lack empirical data about the actual performance of a market that includes both cellular service and fully deployed broadband PCS, which is under construction in almost all markets. An HHI analysis produces a number showing the degree of horizontal concentration in the market: an HHI of less than 1,000 shows an unconcentrated market, in which horizontal concentration is not a concern; an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800 shows a moderately concentrated market, in which certain ownership combinations "potentially raise significant competitive concerns depending on [certain] factors"; and an HHI over 1,800 shows a highly concentrated market, in which certain combinations "are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise" unless a strong showing to the contrary is made.QЍ DOJ/FTC Guidelines,  1.51(a)(c).Q In order to apply the HHI, a measurement of market share (e.g., in terms of customers, revenues, capacity or similar gauges) is necessary. Allocated spectrum is an appropriate measurement of market share for the purpose of analyzing the need for a spectrum cap because it is a measure of a CMRS carrier's longterm capacity and is easily available to the Commission. Capacity has been accepted in antitrust cases as a valid measure of market share.'Ѝ See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 50103 (1974) (uncommitted capacity was measure of market share in business (coal mining) where most sales were made pursuant to longterm contracts that had absorbed most of the total capacity of the business). See also Section on Antitrust Law, ABA, Antitrust law developments (third), Vol. I at 300 & nn.13941 (citing cases where capacity is used as the measure of market shares); DOJ/FTC Guidelines,  1.41. ' The 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap is a simplified version of the HHI, using spectrum capacity as the measurement of market share as it limits the amount of licensed spectrum capacity that any one person or entity may have.  In addition to considering the arguments presented by commenters in this proceeding and in response to the Sixth Circuit's concern about the lack of economic support for the cellular/PCS spectrum cap,RЍ Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 763.R the Commission's competitive analysis staff performed an HHI analysis for various possible structures of a hypothetical market for mobile twoway voice communications service in the same geographic area. This analysis is set forth at Appendix A. In this market, the capacity in a local market is represented by the licensed spectrum for cellular service (two licenses for 25 MHz), broadband PCS (three licenses for 30 MHz and three licenses for 10 MHz), and the largest potential interconnected SMR provider (holding multiple licenses for a total of 10 MHz).  The Commission staff's HHI analysis indicates that the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap is needed to prevent undue market concentration and the noncompetitive conditions in local markets that result from such concentration. The prePCS market situation, consisting of two cellular carriers each with 25 MHz has an HHI of 5,000 extremely high concentration.K Ѝ See Appendix A, Table 1B.K The two, overlapping cellular carriers are already prohibited from owning more than a 5 percent interest in each other.B!Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  22.942.B The addition of a third carrier, an SMR provider with 10 MHz, lowers the HHI only to 3,750.O"Ѝ See, Appendix Table 1C.O Adding the spectrum capacity provided by the issuance of new PCS licenses, if there was no spectrum cap, might result in the two cellular incumbents dividing all the PCS spectrum between themselves. With no new entrants, this would leave the HHI at its previous high level,J#Ѝ See Id., Table 1E.J defeating a major purpose of the Commission in creating broadband PCS to bring more competition into the concentrated mobile telephony market.$Ѝ See Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, First Report, 10 FCC Rcd 8844, 8846, 8859, 8867 (1995). The analysis also shows that, even if there was somewhat less common ownership of PCS spectrum by incumbent cellular operators, the market would still be very highly concentrated without a cap on the ownership of spectrum capacity. For example, if each cellular carrier obtained a 30 MHz PCS license and a 10 MHz PCS license, another 40 MHz of PCS spectrum were held by a new entrant, and the SMR operator remained at 10 MHz, the HHI would still be 3133, far into the "highly concentrated" category.I%Ѝ See, Appendix Table 1F.I  In addition to these hypothetical results if there is no spectrum cap, we note that there are other factors that create a significant risk of such excessive concentration becoming reality. First, while new entrants can deconcentrate many businesses, CMRS markets have significant barriers to entry, most notably the need for spectrum, the expense of obtaining the license and the high costs of construction and operation of new communications systems. Thus, there would be little potential for new entrants to discipline the behavior of the incumbents in the absence of any spectrum cap. Second, the use of competitive bidding for assigning PCS licenses, or the cost of obtaining licenses in a postauction market (i.e., private auctions), would put incumbents at an inherent advantage over new entrants. Economic theory teaches that auctions are won by the bidder who puts the highest value on the property being auctioned. The value of the PCS licenses to the incumbent providers would be their continued economic rents (profits in excess of economic costs), which could be higher than the anticipated profits of any new entrant into a more competitive market. Incumbent firms may thus be willing to pay even more for the chance to impede entry than for the chance to compete vigorously against new entrants. In such an event, the incumbent cellular and SMR licensees would be more likely to win all or most of the PCS licenses at auction, or pay above auction prices in the private, postauction transactions. Accordingly, Congress specifically instructed the Commission to craft its rules for auctionable spectrum licenses to avoid excessive concentration of licenses and provide economic opportunities to a wide variety of applicants.f&Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3)(B); see also supra  16.f  Having a 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap, in contrast to the abovedescribed scenarios without a spectrum cap, will result in a market that has an HHI below 1,900, a tremendous improvement over a two or threecompetitor market. Although some scenarios under the 45 MHz cap could produce an HHI above 1800 (i.e., 1898),K'Ѝ See Appendix A, Table 2E.K which the DOJ/FTC Guidelines would characterize as a highly concentrated market, we believe that, due to certain factors, the risk that significant competitive harm will occur is probably low in most cases. First, there are several other communications services each of which has some, though by no means full, crosselasticity with cellular, broadband PCS, and interconnected SMR services. These other services are paging, narrowband and unlicensed PCS, 220 MHz service, airground service, maritime service, satellitebased mobile services, General Mobile Radio Service, General Wireless Communications Service, interconnected private radio systems, CB radio and other "low end" services, government radio systems, resellers of the foregoing services, and some wired local exchange service. Collectively, these services exert some competitive pressure on cellular, broadband PCS and interconnected SMR that is not reflected in the HHIs calculated by the Commission's competitive analysis staff. There is significant precedent for the use of such competitors as a mitigator of HHIs that are above optimum levels.(ЍFor example, in bank mergers where the HHIs of a relevant market consisting only of banks and savings and loans are above optimum levels, federal regulators often note the existence of credit unions and other "quasibanks" as a successful defense to charges of uncompetitive concentration. Where the latter institutions are present, the regulators state that HHIs may exaggerate the actual degree of concentration. See, e.g., Keycorp, 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 286, 288 & n.12 (1995) (HHI of 2,167); West One Bank, Idaho, 80 Fed. Res. Bull.175, 176 (1994) (HHI of 3833); First Hawaiian, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 52, 5556 & nn.25, 29 (1991) (HHIs between 2696 and 3455). Also, under the DOJ/FTC Guidelines, a highly concentrated market produces competitive concerns depending on certain factors, including how easy or difficult "coordinated interaction" is among the competitors, and whether entry by new competitors will be possible.I)Ѝ DOJ/FTC Guidelines,  23.I Most plausible scenarios under the 45 MHz cap show at least six competitors, reducing the risk of coordinated interaction. With respect to entry, as the Commission allocates and assigns spectrum for more services that have some crosselasticity of demand with broadband CMRS (cellular, broadband PCS, and widearea SMR), a certain amount of increased competition from new competitors could open up more opportunities to enter the market. Additional opportunities to obtain spectrum may also arise through rules allowing for spectrum disaggregation and geographic partitioning, which are currently under consideration by the Commission.P*Ѝ See supra note 55.P In addition, the Commission is taking other significant steps to reduce entry barriers for entrepreneurs and small businesses pursuant to Sections 309(j)(3), 309(j)(4) and 257 of the Communications Act.+Ѝ See generally Market Entry Notice of Inquiry; Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 138; supra note 9. Given these factors, we believe that concentration levels of 1,900 are acceptable and we conclude that the 45 MHz spectrum cap is necessary to prevent the CMRS market from becoming highly concentrated and to avoid an excessive concentration of licenses.  The 45 MHz spectrum cap is also needed specifically to prevent cellular licensees from gaining too great a competitive advantage over new entrants to the wireless telephony market.,Ѝ We note, however, that as more spectrum of a flexible nature is auctioned, our concerns regarding concentration could significantly diminish. See, e.g., Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Permit Flexible Service Offerings in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, WT Docket No. 966, 61 Fed. Reg. 6,189 (Feb. 16, 1996). Cellular companies already hold licenses for 25 MHz of clear spectrum, and they already have technical expertise, customer bases, marketing operations, and antenna and transmitter sites._-Ѝ See DCR Comments at 1314. CTIA also estimates that at yearend 1995 there were approximately 33.8 million cellular subscribers. U.S. Wireless Industry Survey Results: More than 9.6 Million Customers Added in 1995, Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association News Release, Mar. 25, 1996._ In short, cellular operators have a competitive position that is superior to that of any new market entrant. They also have strong incentives to preserve that existing advantage. By limiting current cellular licensees to an additional 20 MHz of spectrum (i.e., two of the three 10 MHz broadband PCS licenses), the 45 MHz cap will help to level the playing field for all new entrants, while ensuring that incumbent providers are not placed at any disadvantage. We therefore disagree with Radiofone's assertion that the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap should be eliminated because it arbitrarily prevents cellular carriers from obtaining large amounts of PCS spectrum.D.Ѝ Radiofone Comments at 3.D  Our 45 MHz spectrum cap also furthers the goal of diversity of ownership that we are mandated to promote under Section 309(j). Section 309(j) directs us, in specifying eligibility for licenses and permits, to avoid excessive concentration of licenses and disseminate licenses among a wide variety of applicants.H/Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3)(B).H The statute further states that in prescribing regulations, the Commission must, inter alia, prescribe area designations and bandwidth assignments that promote economic opportunity for a wide variety of applicants.L0Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(4)(C)(ii).L A spectrum cap is one of the most effective mechanisms we could employ to achieve these goals. More than provisions such as bidding credits and installment payments, which we have adopted to provide opportunities for new entrants in the wireless telephony marketplace, a spectrum cap set at an appropriate level will ensure that the licenses for any particular market are disseminated among diverse service providers. The Cincinnati Bell decision questioned whether the cellular/PCS spectrum limit actually advanced this statutory objective.1Ѝ 69 F.3d at 764 (citing the results of the broadband PCS A and B block auction, in which 99 licenses issued were won by 19 companies). We note, however, that following the first auction for broadband PCS licenses, the number of competitors in every local market in the country doubled, from 2 to 4 licensees. In addition, the C block auction resulted in another new competitor in each local market 493 licenses will soon be awarded to just under 90 small and entrepreneurial businesses. With the cellular/PCS spectrum limit in place, American consumers were guaranteed and received three new competitors to the two cellular incumbents. Accordingly, we affirm that the cellular/PCS spectrum cap fulfilled the mandate of section 309(j) and the 45 MHz cap will continue to serve those objectives in future auctions and the postauction market.   The court in the Cincinnati Bell decision was also concerned that the cellular/ PCS spectrum cap would "have a profound impact on businesses in an industry enmeshed in this country's telecommunications culture." It stated that "[t]he continued existence of some wireless communications businesses rests on their ability to bid on Personal Communications Service licenses" and that "Cellular providers foreclosed from obtaining Personal Communications Service licenses may ultimately be left holding the remnants of an obsolete technology."<2Ѝ 69 F.3d at 764.< Upon further analysis, as discussed above, we have modified our rules in a way that provides cellular licensees additional flexibility to expand into or migrate to PCS technology. Under the old rule, they were limited to one 10 MHz block until the year 2000. The shift to a single 45 MHz spectrum cap will allow incumbent cellular operators to acquire up to two of the 10 MHz broadband PCS licenses (20 MHz) in the upcoming auction for the D, E and F blocks. As many commenters point out, an additional 20 MHz of spectrum will be sufficient to develop and provide new digital services. We note that cellular carriers have also been rapidly implementing digital and other new technologies3Ѝ See 47 C.F.R.  22.901(d) (permitting cellular carriers to utilize alternate technologies, including PCS). with their current 25 MHz of spectrum and that even analog cellular systems are increasing subscribership and providing enhanced services.4Ѝ For example, Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile recently launched its Code Division Multiple Access ("CDMA") service in Trenton, New Jersey and Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Bell Atlantic NYNEX Mobile Launches CDMA Service Using Lucent Technologies Equipment, News Release, Mar. 25, 1996. Additionally, AirTouch has begun using its new CDMA technology in parts of its Los Angeles service area. Airtouch Inaugurates Powerband Service in Largest U.S. Cellular Market, News Release, May 14, 1996.  While our analysis of the CMRS market under the DOJ/FTC Guidelines indicates that the 45 MHz spectrum cap is needed to ensure competition, it also shows that this cap adequately addresses our concerns about anticompetitive behavior. Indeed, our analysis of plausible market structures indicates that the concentration levels under the single 45 MHz spectrum cap would not be higher than the level that would be possible under all three of the existing caps.b5Ѝ Compare Appendix 1, Tables 2DE and Tables 3AB.b Thus, we conclude that the PCS and cellular/PCS spectrum caps are unnecessary.  We also believe that elimination of the cellular/PCS crossownership rule and the 40 MHz PCS spectrum cap in favor of the single 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap has important advantages. Applying the single 45 MHz CMRS cap will give both cellular and PCS providers more flexibility to participate in a more competitive marketplace. A single 45 MHz cap will now enable cellular licensees to obtain 20 MHz of broadband PCS spectrum. We believe that with the advent of digital and other new technologies, 20 MHz of PCS spectrum will be more than sufficient to allow cellular licensees to develop new services in the CMRS market.j6Ѝ See PersonalConnect Comments at 4; CCPR Comments at 45.j Furthermore, we disagree with APC that current marketplace conditions do not call for a change in our PCS rules. As APC notes, numerous new market entrants have emerged to bid aggressively on the 30 MHz PCS licenses.D7Ѝ APC Reply Comments at 4.D Given this source of new competition, we believe it is appropriate to relax our PCS ownership restrictions. The elimination of the cellular/PCS and PCS limits will give PCS providers greater flexibility to own interests in other providers and provide additional services and, hence, enhanced opportunities to compete. In addition, PCS providers will no longer be restricted to less than a 5 percent ownership interest in cellular and other PCS licensees in order to avoid attribution.g8Ѝ See 47 C.F.R.  24.204(d)(2)(i), 24.229(c)(2).g Instead, they will be subject to the more liberal 20 percent attribution level for all CMRS.P9Ѝ See infra at  117119.P  We also note that the 1996 Act requires the Commission to determine in every evennumbered year (beginning with 1998) "whether any regulation is no longer necessary in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic competition between providers of such service" and to modify or repeal such regulation.E:Ѝ 47 U.S.C.  161(a)(2).E In an effort to streamline our regulations now, consistent with the spirit of the 1996 Act, and in light of the findings set forth above, we believe that simplifying our rules to include a single 45 MHz CMRS cap in place of the three separate spectrum caps is warranted. In addition, at the next biennial review of the Commission's regulations under the 1996 Act and in our annual reports on the state of competition in the CMRS market,R;Ѝ See 47 U.S.C.  332(c)(1)(C).R we will continue to evaluate the need for the 45 MHz spectrum cap in its present form.  We decline to alter the 10 percent overlap restriction for the CMRS cap as some commenters suggest. We continue to believe that an overlap of less than 10 percent of the population is sufficiently small that the potential for exercise of undue market power by the cellular operator is slight.<Ѝ Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Establish New Personal Communications Services, Second Report and Order, Gen Docket 90314, 8 FCC Rcd 7700, 7745 (1993) ("PCS Second Report and Order"). Given our decision to eliminate the cellular/PCS and PCS ownership limitations, we are also concerned that greater overlap might lead to anticompetitive practices. We will, however, expand the postauction divestiture provisions of Section 20.6 to conform with the divestiture provisions that previously applied in our cellular/PCS crossownership rule, including the relaxed rule applicable to situations where the overlap exceeds 10 percent, but is less than 20 percent.H=Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.204(f)(A).H Thus, any party holding an attributable ownership interest in a CMRS licensee may be a party to a broadband PCS application if it certifies that, if necessary, it will come into compliance with the CMRS spectrum cap through our postauction divestiture procedures.M>Ѝ See 47 C.F.R.  20.6(e).M B. The 20 Percent Attribution Standard  Background. Section 24.204(d)(2)(ii) of our rules provides that partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest amounting to 20 percent or more of the equity or outstanding stock of a cellular licensee will be attributable for purposes of determining whether an entity is a cellular operator and subject to the cellular/PCS crossownership rule.L?Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  24.204(d)(2)(ii).L Section 24.204(d)(2)(ii) of our rules also provides that cellular ownership interests held by small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by minorities or women are not attributable until they reach at least 40 percent.5@Ѝ Id.5 The Court in Cincinnati Bell held that our 20 percent cellular attribution rule was arbitrary on the ground that the rule does not bear a reasonable relationship to whether a party with a minority interest in a cellular licensee actually has the ability to control that licensee.UAЍ Cincinnati Bell, 69 F.3d at 75961.U  In the Notice, we requested comment on whether we should retain or modify our ownership attribution rule for cellular licensees interested in acquiring broadband PCS licenses. Given other issues raised in the Notice, we asked whether our approach should depend on whether we modify our cellular/PCS crossownership rule or, in the alternative, eliminate this rule and retain only our 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap. We also asked whether we should, in any case, modify the 20 percent attribution standard applicable to the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap in light of the Sixth Circuit's opinion regarding this standard in connection with our cellular/PCS crossownership rule. We also proposed to modify the 40 percent attribution rules related to both the cellular/PCS crossownership and CMRS spectrum aggregation limit provisions for F block purposes, as we did for the C block, by removing the provisions that increase the attribution threshold to 40 percent if the holder of the ownership interest is a woman or minorityowned business.  Comments. Many commenters assert that the 20 percent attribution standard should not be altered.BЍ Conestoga Comments at 4; Vanguard Comments at 6; Alliance Comments at 9; Cox Reply Comments at 6; DCR Reply Comments at 12; TDS Reply Comments at 2; APC Reply Comments at 6; Sprint Reply Comments at 24; PCIA Reply Comments at 78. Vanguard argues that most of the principal cellular companies are now publicly traded and, therefore, a 20 percent interest held by a single shareholder clearly would create the possibility of at least de facto control.CCЍ Vanguard Comments at 6.C Cox opposes a "controlling interest" test because it would be ineffective, subject to undetectable manipulation, and difficult to enforce. Furthermore, Cox asserts that brightline attribution rules traditionally have been used by the Commission as an effective and efficient means of identifying cognizable opportunities for influence and control, and in fact, the Commission has used a lower standard (e.g., 5 percent) in other services.DDЍ Cox Reply Comments at 7.D DCR argues that control is not the Commission's concern in determining what level of investment should be considered a cognizable interest. Rather, the Commission has traditionally been concerned with the potential for significant influence over management or operational decisions. Where that concern is especially significant, as it is here, the Commission has generally and reasonably opted for a more inclusive attribution rule.EЍ DCR Reply Comments at 12 (citing Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast Interests, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd 3606, 361620 (1994) ("Attribution Notice")). TDS contends that the attribution levels for all of the existing spectrum caps should remain the same in order to avoid uncertainty about competitive entry opportunities and delay of service due to litigation.DFЍ TDS Reply Comments at 2.D Conestoga, the Alliance, and Cox also support our proposal to adopt a 40 percent attribution standard for small businesses and rural telephone companies as we did for the C block.wGЍ Alliance Comments at 9; Conestoga Comments at 4; Cox Reply Comments at 68.w  TEC, Mountain Solutions, and OmniPoint argue that a stricter 10 percent attribution standard, such as that promulgated by Congress in the definition of "affiliate" in the 1996 Act, should apply to the cellular/PCS crossownership rule.HЍ TEC Comments at 15; Mountain Solutions Comments at 12; OmniPoint Reply Comments at 11. See 47 U.S.C.  153(1). TEC and Mountain Solutions further argue that use of a statutory benchmark should prevent further court challenge.bIЍ TEC Comments at 15; Mountain Solutions Comments at 12.b In contrast, however, CBT contends that nothing in the 1996 Act suggests that the 10 percent standard should be applied for attribution purposes in PCS licensing.`JЍ Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co. Comments at 2 ("CBT").`  Several commenters assert that a control test should be used for attribution purposes instead of a brightline standard.KЍ AT&T Comments at 10; BellSouth Comments at 1112; US West Comments at 1; GTE Comments at 12; RTC Comments at 9; Western Comments at 22. They argue, inter alia, that a brightline standard does not effectively determine control in most cases and, instead, control must be determined under the specific facts of each case.?LЍ GTE Comments at 12.? They assert that the Commission should consider a standard based on control in light of the Commission's previous failure to examine less restrictive alternatives to a brightline rule.CMЍ Western Comments at 23.C Western also argues that the Commission should focus primarily on those ownership interests that it has recognized in the context of cellular/PCS ownership restrictions as potentially having the most anticompetitive effect (i.e., controlling interests).LNЍ Western Reply Comments at 1213.L  CBT contends that a single majority shareholder exception should apply to the existing attribution rule.OЍ CBT Comments at 4; CBT Reply Comments at 34. See also RTC Comments at 1011; CTIA Comments at 15. Specifically, CBT suggests that no minority stock or limited partnership interest should be attributable if a single holder (or group of affiliated holders) owns more than 50 percent of the outstanding stock or partnership equity or has voting control of the licensee's affairs.>PЍ CBT Comments at 4.> CBT also argues that no commenter has presented any new reason for or evidence supporting a 20 percent attribution rule.DQЍ CBT Reply Comments at 2.D  CTIA argues that the attribution level should be increased from 20 percent to a level between 30 and 35 percent. CTIA asserts that the danger of undue market power in a single firm is sharply constrained by the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap, under which a controlling shareholder is limited to a market share of 26.5 percent, a percentage well below the 35 percent threshold recognized to be necessary for undue market power.@RЍ CTIA Comments at 14.@ CTIA also supports adoption of a single majority shareholder exception to its suggested higher attribution level.<SЍ Id. at 15.< AT&T and RTC suggest that if a controlbased rule is not adopted, then a 40 percent threshold, as applied to small businesses and rural telephone companies in the C block, should apply because there is no evidence that this level has created opportunities for anticompetitive behavior.VTЍ AT&T Comments at 10; RTC Comments at 910.V  ICGC and ONE argue that the attribution rules adopted in the Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order should be reinstated. They contend that this approach will create meaningful opportunities for small businesses in accordance with Congressional intent.VUЍ ICGC Comments at 13; ONE Comments at 13.V  GTE and DCR argue that any change to the attribution rule should be applied prospectively because retroactive application of any rule changes would be harmful to PCS licensees, would not serve the public interest, and would be contrary to federal law.YVЍ GTE Comments at 13; DCR Reply Comments at 13.Y In contrast, CBT believes that because the old attribution rule was defective from the start, any licensing that took place under the old rule is of questionable validity and those aggrieved by the old rule should be allowed to obtain redress.DWЍ CBT Reply Comments at 5.D  Decision. Our decision to eliminate the 35 MHz cellular/PCS spectrum cap renders the issue of whether to modify the attribution standard of Section 24.204(d) of our rules moot.kXЍ 47 C.F.R. 24.204(d); see supra  94.k We reaffirm, however, the 20 percent attribution standard for the purpose of determining whether an entity is subject to the 45 MHz CMRS spectrum aggregation limit. We also conclude that the attribution standard for the 45 MHz spectrum cap should be made race and genderneutral such that a 40 percent attribution standard applies to all small businesses and rural telephone companies. We believe that extending the 40 percent threshold to noncontrolling investors in small businesses as we did for the C block licenses will promote additional investment in small business applicants and ensure broad participation in PCS by designated entities.tYЍ See Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 162.t֌ We agree with Vanguard that a 20 percent interest held by a single entity would create a possibility of de facto control.QZЍ Vanguard Comments at 6. See also Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Third Report and Order, GN Docket No. 93252, 9 FCC Rcd 7988, 8114 (1994) (citing FASB Accounting Principals Board Opinion No. 18 (1970)).Q Such an interest (whether 20 percent or less) that conveys to its holder actual working control (including investor control) is already attributable under our rules.F[Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  20.6(d)(1).F We believe generally, however, that even an entity that does not have de facto or de jure control but owns a 20 percent or more interest in a licensee would have sufficient influence to reduce competition and should be subject to the CMRS spectrum aggregation limit.h\Ѝ See Cox Reply Comments at 7; DCR Reply Comments at 12.h Historically, we have included for attribution purposes those ownership and other interests that convey a degree of control or "influence" to their holder sufficient to warrant limitation.]Ѝ See Attribution Notice, 10 FCC Rcd at 3609. See also 47 C.F.R.  20.6(d)(9) (attributing certain management agreements). "Influence" has been viewed as "an interest that is less than controlling, but through which the holder is likely to induce a licensee or permittee to take actions to protect the investment."^Ѝ Attribution Notice, 10 FCC Rcd at 360910 (citing Amendment of Multiple Ownership Rules, 18 FCC Rcd 288, 29293 (1953)). We note that attribution rules for other services typically apply much lower ownership benchmarks of 5 to 10 percent. Both cable and broadcast use a 5 to 10 percent attribution level. In the broadcast multiple ownership context, for example, any interest amounting to 5 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of a corporate broadcast licensee, cable television system or daily newspaper is attributable.I_Ѝ 47 C.F.R.  73.3555, n. 2.I Interests held by certain passive investors are attributable if they amount to 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock.`Ѝ Id. See also Attribution Notice, 10 FCC Rcd at 362830 (where the Commission sought comment on whether the 10 percent attribution level should be raised). In the contexts of cable operator/broadcast network crossownership,HaЍ 47 C.F.R.  76.501, n. 2.H cable national subscriber (horizontal) limits,EbЍ 47 C.F.R.  76.503(f).E cable channel occupancy (vertical) limits,EcЍ 47 C.F.R.  76.504(h).E and the MDS/cable crossownership limit,KdЍ 47 C.F.R.  21.912(c), n. 1.K the attribution standards are identical to those used in broadcasting. We further note, as do some commenters, that the 1996 Act defines "affiliate" as a "person that . . . owns or controls, is owned or controlled by, or is under common ownership or control with, another person. . . [The] term 'own' means to own an equity interest (or the equivalent thereof) of more than 10 percent."BeЍ 47 U.S.C.  153(l).B  We continue to believe that a higher benchmark of 20 percent should apply for purposes of the CMRS spectrum cap in order to encourage capital investment and business opportunities in CMRS. Given the changing technology and the variety of competing services that will be subject to this limitation, we believe that increased flexibility in our rules will enable CMRS providers to adapt their services to meet customer demand.efЍ See CMRS Third Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd at 8010.e Furthermore, we originally adopted a 20 percent attribution level in our cellular/PCS crossownership rules to allow partial owners of cellular licensees to participate in PCS, in light of several partial and often passive ownership interests that may have resulted from early settlements during the initial phase of cellular licensing.agЍ PCS Second Report and Order, 8 FCC Rcd at 7745.a We continue to believe that cellular providers should be given ample opportunity to compete in the CMRS market, given the role that existing infrastructure and technologies can play in speeding the deployment of new technologies.}hЍ See also CTIA Comments at 45; CCPR Comments at 5; Radiofone Comments at 4.} Thus, we believe that maintaining a 20 percent attribution level for the CMRS cap will allow a wide variety of players (i.e., PCS, cellular and SMR providers) to enter the marketplace while still preventing anticompetitive practices that would have harmful effects on consumers.  We disagree with commenters who suggest that only controlling interests should be attributable. Establishing a control test would require us to conduct frequent casebycase determinations of control, which are timeconsuming, factspecific, and subjective. The bright line 20 percent attribution rule avoids these problems. Also, for the reasons discussed below, a single majority shareholder exception to the rule is not appropriate for all situations involving CMRS licensees and their owners, and so adoption of such an exception is not a suitable bright line substitute for 20 percent attribution. However, we adopt a less restrictive alternative and allow licensees with noncontrolling minority investors with potentially conflicting CMRS ownership interests to seek waivers of the spectrum cap rule where the licensee is controlled by a single majority shareholder or controlling general partner.  We reject a controlbased attribution test because significant, but noncontrolling, investments have sufficient potential to affect the level of competition in the CMRS market. The CMRS spectrum cap ownership attribution rule, just as all other ownership attribution rules and similar statutory provisions, must take such interests into account. Economic theory predicts that where a CMRS licensee owns a substantial portion of one of its competitors, neither company has as strong an incentive to compete vigorously against its partner as it does with respect to an unrelated competitor. That is the case for several reasons. A company that is entitled to a substantial percentage of the profit generated by its competitor will be reluctant to undercut the competitor's price doing so would amount to taking money out of its own pocket. Rather than compete on price, both companies have an incentive to maintain a high price level by coordinated interaction. In any event, the minority shareholder, would have an incentive to stifle vigorous price competition. It would also have the capability of doing so, because a minority owner may exert influence over the company by challenging various business decisions, by conducting (or even just threatening) litigation, by refusing to provide additional capital, by insisting upon business audits, or by using other mechanisms by which minority owners protect their investments in closely held firms.  Theoretical analysis has demonstrated that partial ownership interests can create the very noncompetitive markets that we want to avoid.iЍ Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly, 21 RAND Journal of Economics 275, 285 (1990). Even "silent financial interests" i.e,. noncontrolling shares may affect the behavior of the partly owned company by causing the minority owner to take into account its behavior on the profits of its partly owned competitor. Indeed, as noted above, Congress was also apparently concerned about such competitive incentives when it defined ownership in the 1996 Act to mean an interest of ten percent.wjЍ See 47 U.S.C.  153(1) (defining the terms "affiliate" and "own").w The Communications Act also limits foreign ownership interests in CMRS licenses to 20 percent.jkЍ 47 U.S.C.  310(b)(3); see also 47 C.F.R.  20.5.j Although these statutory ownership attribution criteria do not directly apply to our CMRS ownership attribution rules, they indicate that Congress believed that even noncontrolling, minority ownership interests can convey significant influence to their holders. As discussed above, other Commission rules attribute ownership interests of as little as five percent.&lЍAs we explained at the time we first adopted the PCS/cellular attribution rule, we decided to attribute ownership interests of 20 percent or more rather than 5 percent, due to the unique history of cellular licensing in which settlements of licensing disputes left many companies with noncontrolling interests greater than 5 percent. We did not think it fair to exclude such companies from CMRS and so we raised the attribution threshold to 20 percent. See supra  119.&  Moreover, in a market such as the CMRS market, reduced competitive incentives between coowned firms have the additional danger of potentially reducing competition in the entire market. As discussed above, the CMRS market will be fairly concentrated to begin with it will have at most five or six competitors, yielding an HHI index in the moderately concentrated range (and one of those competitors will be a small business 40 percent of which might be owned by one of its competitors) and significant new entry into the market by new competitors will not be possible (at least in the short run). Theory predicts that in that situation, a reduction in competition between two of the participants in the market will in turn reduce competition among the remaining participants.mЍ Farrell & Shapiro, supra at 286. See also R.J. Reynolds & B.R. Snapp, "The Competitive Effects of Partial Equity Interests and Joint Ventures," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 4, at 141153 (1986). That reduction in competition occurs because the market effectively becomes an even more concentrated oligopoly, in which all of the companies are better off keeping prices high and competing instead on such matters as corporate image.   We recognize that small businesses and rural telephone companies, as well as noncontrolling investors in small businesses, may have nonattributable ownership of up to 40 percent under our rules. But these relaxed attribution rules present a situation entirely different from the 20 percent attribution rule. We have been charged expressly by Congress to ensure that small businesses, including businesses owned by women and minorities, and rural telephone companies are given meaningful opportunities to participate in the provision of wireless services.^nЍ See 47 U.S.C.  309(j)(3)(2), (4)(C)(D).^ Our rules must also promote the development and rapid deployment of new technologies, products, and services for the benefit of the public, including those residing in rural areas.FoЍ Id. at 309(j)(3)(A).F One of the most formidable barriers to such participation is the difficulty such businesses face in raising sufficient capital to compete in the highly capitalintensive wireless communications businesses. By increasing the attribution threshold for such designated entities and their investors, our goal was to make capital more readily available by reducing the number of investors such businesses must seek out. We also concluded that smaller entities that have some interests in cellular operations may be especially effective PCS competitors because of their cellular experience. This will help ensure that service is brought quickly to underserved areas and that designated entities become viable competitors. In particular, rural telephone companies and some small cellular companies, due to their existing infrastructure, are uniquely positioned rapidly to introduce PCS services into their service areas or adjacent areas.pЍ See Memorandum Opinion and Order, GEN Docket 90314, 9 FCC Rcd 4957, 5007 (1994).  However, we did not exempt small businesses and rural telephone companies entirely from the cellular eligibility rules because such an exemption could foreclose competition from a new PCS entrant. In maintaining the 45 MHz spectrum cap, we remain concerned that there is potential for some of these parties to compete less vigorously in the nascent PCS industry. While we recognize that our relaxation of the rules in favor of the CMRS spectrum cap presents a risk of lower than optimal competition, we must balance competing public policies and we believe that this is the proper balance to fulfill our various statutory mandates under Section 309(j) of the Communications Act.   Further, we decline to adopt a single majority shareholder exception for the CMRS spectrum cap rule as suggested by CBT and CTIA._qЍ See CBT Comments at 46; CTIA Comments at 15._ As discussed above, economic theory indicates that an entity holding less than a majority interest may influence the CMRS market in an anticompetitive manner. In such circumstances, it makes no difference whether there is another shareholder that exercises control since significant minority ownership that does not convey control still poses a serious danger of hindering competition in a concentrated market such as CMRS. These same concerns arise with respect to other emerging services, and legislative and regulatory initiatives through which competition is being introduced to market segments that may not be highly competitive do not include a single majority shareholder exception. For example, we did not adopt a single majority shareholder exception for purposes of attributing ownership in the context of cable crossownership with video programmers, Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Service ("MMDS" or "wireless cable"), and Satellite Master Antenna Television Service ("SMATV" or "private cable"). Although we recognized that a single majority shareholder exception was a component of the broadcast attribution rules, we found that more inclusive rules were necessary to curb the incentives of cable operators to influence the behavior of their programming affiliates to the detriment of competitors, to prevent cable operators from "warehousing potential competition," to encourage alternative providers of multichannel video service, and to promote the development of local competition to established cable operators.hrЍ See, e.g., Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribution and Carriage, First Report and Order, MM Docket 92-265, 8 FCC Rcd 3359, 3360, 3370 (1993); Cable Horizontal and Vertical Limits, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Docket No. 92-264, 8 FCC Rcd 6828, 6841 (1993).h These objectives are similar to those set forth above in support of a 45 MHz CMRS spectrum cap and CMRS ownership attribution rules. We note as another example that, in safeguarding competition with the entry of the monopoly Bell Operating Companies into long distance, equipment manufacturing and alarm monitoring, Congress did not provide for a single majority shareholder exception to the 1996 Act's new definition of "affiliate."gsЍ See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.  153(1), 272, 273(d)(8).g  We further note that, although the broadcast rules contain a single majority shareholder exception, broadcast services are also subject to the Commission's "crossinterest" policy. This policy is administered on a casebycase basis and prohibits individuals from having "meaningful" interests in two broadcast stations, or a daily newspaper and a broadcast station, or a television station and a cable television system, when both outlets serve "substantially the same area."tЍ See Review of the Commission's Regulations Governing Attribution of Broadcast Interests, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, MM Docket 94150, 10 FCC Rcd 3606, 364249 (1995) ("Broadcast Attribution Notice"). One "meaningful relationship" the policy covers involves an individual who has an attributable interest in one media outlet and a substantial nonattributable equity interest in another media outlet in the same market, including a minority stock interest in a corporation having a single majority shareholder.uЍ See Reexamination of the Commission's CrossInterest Policy, Further Notice of Inquiry/Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 4 FCC Rcd 2035, 2036 n.11 (1989). Thus, while under our rules a minority equity interest in a broadcast station is generally not attributable if there is a single majority stockholder, our crossinterest policy requires us to scrutinize such minority interests on a casebycase basis to determine whether they "engender concerns about arms length competition and diversity in certain markets in which the interest holder also has an attributable interest in another outlet.">vЍ Id. at 2036.> If the Commission finds that such concerns do exist in a particular case, it may deem the minority interest a meaningful relationship and prohibit its acquisition.  The principal distinction, then, between our CMRS ownership attribution rules and our broadcast rules is the presumption we apply in assessing whether a minority equity interest in an entity with a single majority shareholder raises concerns such that the interest should nevertheless be attributed to the interest holder. Currently, in the broadcast context, we generally presume, under the single majority shareholder exception, that such interests should not be attributable, but under our crossinterest policy we still may find in individual cases that this presumption should not apply given the competition and diversity concerns the particular case may raise.wЍ We note that we have recently sought comment in our pending broadcast attribution proceeding on restricting the availability of the single majority shareholder exception to our attribution rules, and have also sought comment on whether we should eliminate the crossinterest policy and instead rely solely on our attribution rules as the means of attributing interests that raise concerns. Broadcast Attribution Notice at 3632, 364249. In the CMRS context, for the reasons stated above, we believe as a general matter that there should be no single majority shareholder exception, but, as noted, we will allow noncontrolling minority investors to seek waivers of the spectrum cap rule where the licensee is controlled by a single majority shareholder or controlling general partner. In view of the competitive situation in the CMRS market, described above, we believe that this distinction between our CMRS and broadcasting rules and procedures is justified.   Hence, we believe that, as a general matter, minority stock interests and limited partnership interests should be deemed attributable CMRS ownership interests even if a single holder (or group of affiliated holders) owns more than 50 percent of the outstanding stock or partnership equity or has voting control of the CMRS licensee. Nevertheless, we believe that there may be limited circumstances where the existence of a single majority shareholder (or a single, controlling general partner) may mitigate the competitive impact of common ownership and the ability of the noncontrolling interest holder to influence the licensee. Accordingly, we will implement two less restrictive measures as an alternative to attributing ownership in such cases.  First, as we previously did with our cellular/PCS crossownership rule, we will allow parties with noncontrolling, attributable interests in CMRS licensees to have an attributable (or controlling) interest in another CMRS application that would exceed the 45 MHz spectrum cap so long as certain postlicensing divestiture procedures are followed.OxЍ See 47 C.F.R.  24.204(f).O A noncontrolling attributable interest is one where the holder has less than a 50 percent voting interest and there is an unaffiliated single holder of a 50 percent or greater voting interest. This will allow interest holders in licensees with a single majority shareholder to obtain another CMRS license (or attributable interest therein) through an auction or other means, subject to the interest holder coming into compliance with our divestiture provisions within 90 days of grant of the conflicting license.  Second, we will consider requests for waivers of the CMRS spectrum cap that make an affirmative showing that an otherwise attributable ownership interest should not be attributed to its holder because: ` ` ` The interest holder has less than a 50 percent voting interest and there is an unaffiliated single holder of a 50 percent or greater voting interest; ` ` ` The interest holder is not likely to affect the local market in an anticompetitive manner;  ` ` ` The interest holder is not involved in operations of the licensee and does not have the ability to influence the licensee on a regular basis; and  ` ` ` Grant of a waiver is in the public interest because the benefits of such common ownership to the public outweigh any potential for anticompetitive harm to the market. X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8: