

**Reading List for Combined Value Problems over heterogeneous goods
(includes combinatoric mechanisms)**

[I have not read all of these so they may be mis-specified]

July 10, 2000

1. Auctions

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- Cramton, Peter and Jesse Schwartz (1999), "Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Working Paper, University of Maryland.
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